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Abstract 
In recent years democratization and multiparty elections have come to prominence among 
development policy makers as tools for reestablishing peace and legitimate rule in fragile countries. 
However, often democratic transitions lead to political violence and civil war. A case in point is Côte 
d’Ivoire: in the wake of democratization the country descended into civil war after three decades of 
political stability. The thesis examines how and to what extent the introduction of multiparty democracy 
changed the power balance in the Ivorian society, and what impact those changes had on political 
behavior and organization, and thereby on the increasing political instability that escalated into civil war. 
The question is addressed through an institutional approach of political settlement analysis based on 
Mushtaq Khan’s analytical framework, and in this way the contribution of the thesis consists of a 
coherent analysis of the Ivorian post-colonial history of political economy, from Côte d’Ivoire’s 
independence in 1960 and until the outbreak of civil war in 2002. The analysis builds on the vast  
Anglophone and Francophone secondary literature available on Côte d’Ivoire. 
In the 1960s the ruling elite successfully centralized the management of cocoa and coffee, creating an 
economy based on agricultural exports and redirecting the rents to industrial investments that met the 
interests of the ruling elite’s capitalist ambitions. A high operational equilibrium emerged in this period 
under ‘constrained patrimonialism’. But, as the cocoa and coffee prices fell in the 1980s, the economic 
policies of the regime proved unviable. The operational equilibrium weakened as struggles over rents 
within the ever expanding ruling elite intensified and consequently factionalized the ruling party. Upon 
the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, rivalry over the presidency resulted in defection from the 
ruling coalition of the primarily Muslim supporters from the North. The defection shifted the horizontal 
distribution of power between elites, but had only little effect on the vertical power distribution, 
thereby prolonging the period of ‘constrained patrimonialism’ under the ruling elite’s increasing use of 
repressive means. Finally, in 1999 the ruling coalition was altered and, ‘competitive clientelism’ 
emerged as the government was toppled in a coup d’état. However, the operational equilibrium 
weakened further as the new political leaders proved unable to broaden their coalitions and relied on 
authoritarian repressive means instead. 
By applying Khan’s framework, the thesis highlights the complex interplay between democratization, 
economic institutions and political organizations in Côte d’Ivoire and how this led to the emergence of a 
repressive version of ‘competitive clientelism’: While the mechanisms of democratization only 
empowered the lower level agents at a slow pace, the analysis reveals that the primary forces that 
destabilized the political settlement were economic and, that democratization only indirectly affected 
the political destabilization as voter mobilization strategies in the specific structures of Ivorian political 
organization came to hamper the possibilities of coalition building and exacerbate the ensuing conflict. 
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The findings stress the need to pay special attention to voter mobilization strategies, when studying the 
impact of democratization. Furthermore it suggests that a political settlement analysis of the present 
post-war Côte d’Ivoire would be likely to reveal significant insights into the long time effects of the 
democratization process. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War democratization has been a central theme in the development discourse. 
Fusing it with economic development over the paradigm of ‘good governance’ democratization came to 
prominence in the developmental policies and led to  massive pressure on aid dependent countries to 
carry out reforms of political liberalization and multiparty elections in the late 1980s. Consequently, vast 
resources has been spent by the donor community to secure such processes as Africa saw a wave of 
multiparty elections taking place in former single-party states in the early 1990s. However, recent 
studies question the connection between democratization and economic development. Meanwhile, in 
the wake of the War against Terror and the new attention on fragile states, democratization and 
multiparty elections are now considered central to political trust building and, to the establishment of a 
viable political order in the context of fragile states.  
The international community’s understanding of the role of democratization in development was most 
eloquently put in 1996 when the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proclaimed that 
"Because democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable through 
periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are more likely to promote and respect the 
rule of law, respect individual and minority rights, cope effectively with social conflict, absorb migrant 
populations and respond to the needs of marginalized groups. They are therefore less likely to abuse 
their power against the peoples of their own State territories. Democracy within States thus fosters the 
evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. In this way, a culture of democracy 
is fundamentally a culture of peace.”1 
Almost 20 years later, the main assumption still prevails when, in DANIDA’s annual report for 2010, it is 
stated that “The new strategy of Denmark’s development cooperation places the promotion of freedom, 
democracy and human rights at the centre of the developmental policies”2 and furthermore, in the 
DANIDA Road Map 2011 for Fragile States elaborates that  “Denmark’s key focus in fragile states will 
be to contribute to building up states where the support of the population constitutes the primary 
authority. This presupposes that the voices of the citizens are heard (…) Denmark concentrates its 
support on five areas where the needs are particularly great in fragile states: stabilisation and 
security; Promotion of improved livelihoods and economic opportunities; Democratisation, good 
governance and human rights; Conflict prevention; and Regional conflict management” (Danida, 
2011: 3-4). 
While democratization continues to be a central part of the developmental paradigm it has been 
conveniently ignored by development policy makers that democratization processes is often followed 
violent conflicts or by civil war. Therefore, while most scholars are preoccupied with the impact of 
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http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1833
 
2
 My own translation. http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/aarsberetning2010/2/  
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democratization in fragile post-war contexts, this paper examines the introduction of multiparty 
elections into a relatively stable political environment and, how democratization affects this stability. To 
better understand if and how the introduction of democratic institutions negatively affect the political 
stability the question of the thesis is therefore, how and to what extent did the introduction of 
multiparty democracy change the power balance in the Ivorian society, and what impact did those 
changes have on political behavior and organization, and thereby on Côte d’Ivoire’s descend into civil 
war? 
1.2. The Ivorian Experience 
Côte d’Ivoire seems to fit perfectly into the pattern that democracy produces ethnic violence, and as 
such the country presents an obvious choice for the study of this phenomenon. While many other 
African countries suffered from political instability, armed conflict and economic hardship in the post-
colonial era, Côte d’Ivoire under the undisputed leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny became a 
showcase of political stability and economic boom. From 1960 and until the late 1970s Côte d’Ivoire 
experienced impressive growth rates making it the economic powerhouse of West Africa and, from 
independence and until the early 1980s Côte d’Ivoire experienced internal political stability rarely seen 
in West Africa. However, due to an emerging economic crisis and the pressures from the democratic 
wave sweeping sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the 1980s, the one-party system that Houphouët-
Boigny had so successfully built had started to erode and, in 1990 Houphouët-Boigny was pressured into 
allowing the first multiparty elections in post-colonial time. 
With the introduction of multiparty democracy, political tensions rose further and became increasingly 
ethnic in nature after Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993. The elections in 1995 was marred by political 
violence and the oppositions’ boycott, and just before the elections in 2000, Houphouët-Boigny’s 
successor, Henry Bédié was toppled in a military coup d’état. When the elections took place a few 
months later it was in an atmosphere of extreme tension. The fact that the leader behind the coup 
d’état lost the elections to the opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo resulted in the outbreak of political 
violence on a scale never seen before in Ivorian history. Although Gbagbo took over the presidency this 
did not solve the ethno-political tensions. In 2002 a failed coup d’état escalated into a full blown civil 
war devastating the country and bringing democratization to a halt. Most fighting ended in late 2004 
but, at this point Côte d’Ivoire was in reality divided into a northern part controlled by rebel forces and a 
southern part under government control. Peace negotiation supplemented by a UN peace keeping 
mission maintained organized military operations at a low level in the following years, but local 
hostilities and raids against civilians increased. In 2007 a peace agreement was finally signed. Elections 
were supposed to be held the same year but were delayed six times. When the elections were finally 
held in 2010, President Gbagbo refused to recognize the result. Consequently political violence 
increased and, in February 2011 the rebel forces launched a new full scale offensive. After yet another 
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civil war Gbagbo was arrested and the winner of the 2010 elections, Ouattara took over the presidency. 
However, whether his accession to power will result in lasting peace remains an open question. 
As in many other new democracies the ethnic diversity of the population provided nourishment for 
conflict. The 22 million Ivoirians are composed by a multitude of ethnic groups. They can be  grouped 
into four major linguistic families: the Mandés, making up 26.5 per cent of the population; The people 
from Volta, also known as the Gur 17.6 per cent; The Krous, 11 per cent, and the Akan group 42.1 per 
cent. The remaining 2.8 per cent are mainly of Lebanese or French origin (Akindès 2004: 12). However, a 
socio-economic and cultural North-South divide also facilitated conflict. The landscape of the North are 
characterized by open dry Savannah land, while the coastal South is dominated by humid fertile 
forestland, large areas of which have been turned into farmland for the production the country’s main 
export crops since the colonial era, coffee and cocoa. The commercial potential of the southern regions 
has also turned this part of the country into the richest one, while the North remains poor. Adding 
further to the North-South divide, the people of the North is largely Muslim and those of the South 
mostly Christian. In Côte d’Ivoire the Muslim makes up approximately 39 per cent of the population, 
while 33 per cent are Christians3. 
In this thesis the examination of the impact of democratization on the Ivorian society will be addressed 
from a political economy perspective by addressing the thesis question through the analysis of the 
evolution of the Ivorian political settlement. The analysis will be based on Mushtaq Khan’s conceptual 
framework which allows an institutional approach to the democratization process. In this context the 
main focus will be on how multiparty elections affected the power relations and rent seeking behavior 
between political actors and, how this in return produced and restrained the possibility of a viable 
political settlement.  
Khan’s approach calls for a historical analysis of the political settlement (Khan, 1995). Thus, the analysis 
of the Ivorian political settlement will take its beginning from the time around Côte d’Ivoire’s 
independence in 1960. Since the purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of democratization in 
the country’s descend into civil war, the analysis ends with the outbreak of civil war in 2002. Thus, the 
main contribution of the thesis will be the presentation of a coherent analysis of the evolution of the 
political settlement in Côte d’Ivoire from the time of independence in 1960 and until the outbreak of the 
first civil conflict in 2002. 
After a few theoretical and methodological considerations in Chapter 2, I analyze the evolution of the 
political settlement in Côte d’Ivoire chronologically in the three following chapters; Chapter 3 explores 
the establishment of the PDCI regime and the ensuing political settlement in the post-colonial era from 
1960 to 1980. Chapter 4 investigates the responses of the ruling elite to the challenges of economic 
crisis and the reforms of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) from approximately 1980 to 1994 
                                                          
3
 2008 estimates (CIA World Factbook). 
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and, what consequences these had for the political settlement. Finally, in Chapter 5 the era of political 
liberalization from 1990 and until the descent into civil war in 2002 is examined. In order to evaluate the 
interplay between democracy and other institutions and organizations in the Ivorian society, the 
chronological analysis is followed in Chapter 6 by a summary of the evolution of the political settlement 
and reflections on the causes leading it into crisis. This eventually leads to a few concluding remarks.  
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2. Theorizing Civil Conflict 
When armed conflict occurs in societies like the Ivorian characterized by an ethnically diverse 
population and, the struggles evolves along the lines of these groupings, cultural factors such as 
ethnicity and religion seems an obvious explanation of the conflict. The academic theories supporting 
such an interpretation are plentiful. Most notably Samuel Huntington’s of the clash of civilizations 
hypothesis that, following the ideological conflicts of the Cold War, the conflicts of the future would be 
based on the clashes between civilizations. Huntington’s infamous world map, dividing the globe into 
these civilizations, even draws a civilizational fault line right across Côte d’Ivoire, dividing the country 
into a northern Muslim and a southern Christian part, not dissimilar to the de facto division of the 
country following the outbreak of civil war in 2002 (Huntington, 1996). Elaborating on some of the same 
ideas, in 1994 Kaplan published the epic article The Coming Anarchy, in which he foresaw the conflicts of 
the 21st century to be stateless and based on ethnic and cultural contradictions, even foreseeing the 
Ivorian civil war almost by a decade (Kaplan, 1994). These hypotheses have however been criticized for 
their primordial perception of ethnicity and culture, and for not taking into consideration social and 
economic factors that contribute to the outbreak of conflict and even to the construction of cultural 
identities. 
Instead, within the last decade a new rational choice approach to the understanding of civil wars has 
enjoyed growing attention from academics and, led economists to discuss the onset of conflicts as being 
motivated either by greed or grievance. Greed as the motive behind conflicts has predominantly been 
promoted by Paul Collier, who through quantitative studies of collected data from conflict afflicted 
countries has come to the conclusion that conflicts reflect elite competition over resource rents and, in 
a later readjustment of this greed model, he introduces the hypothesis of feasibility, arguing that civil 
war occurs in situations where one part stands to gain materially from war. Thus it needs to be 
materially feasible (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000) (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohner, 2006). An important assertion is 
that, as a consequence inequality does not play a part in adding to the risk of civil war. In fact, Fearon 
and Laitin even claims that religious or ethnic diversity makes little contribution to civil war risk (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003). These conclusions are contradicted by the scholars who support the grievance model. 
According to those scholars, identity and group formation is central to the mobilization of support for 
violent conflict. There are several approaches to the theory of grievance which overlap, but I will limit 
myself to mention those of relative deprivation and horizontal inequality. The relative deprivation 
approach explains conflict as the outcome of too great a leap between what people think they deserve 
and, what they actually believe they can get. The approach of horizontal inequality on the other hand 
focuses on horizontal inequalities between groups classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences 
or tribal affiliation ect. as the cause of civil war. As such, the two approaches do not contradict one 
another but are rather supplementing each other. Most interestingly for the case of Côte d’Ivoire, Østby 
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suggests that democracy may facilitate the transformation of such horizontal inequalities into conflict, 
by permitting protests (Østby, 2006). 
While the greed and grievance approaches constitutes a theoretical dichotomy, the two approaches 
may also be seen as complementary theories. As Murshed and Tadjoeddin argue, grievance and 
horizontal inequality may be best at explaining the onset of civil conflicts (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2008), 
but it does not provide a convincing explanation why such conflicts persist and, it is furthermore hard to 
imagine the existence of greed without the presence of grievance. Certainly, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire 
grievances along ethnic lines seem to have been among the root cause of the conflict, while the rising 
number of people who based their livelihood on the conflict as the economy became increasingly war 
based – such as soldiers taking bribe to let civilians through checkpoints (McGovern, 2011: 30) – indicate 
that greed became an increasingly important factor as the conflict persisted. 
However, the greed and grievance approaches are not completely unproblematic. The theory of greed, 
besides being criticized of being based on too thin empirical data, is being questioned on the basis that it 
does not take into considerations the destructiveness of war, which severely weakens the feasibility 
argument and, furthermore the model implies full information. Another critique that applies to both the 
greed and the grievance model is that evidently, not all countries that fulfill the criteria of increased risk 
of civil war actually descent into violent conflicts. Arguably, critics argue that the two models are missing 
out on the decisive factor to ignite a violent conflict. Therefore, on the assumption that strong 
institutions may secure the peace - as they provide an effective framework for negotiation and 
regulation of conflict, while weak institutions cannot prevent the outbreak of violence - in more recent 
years an increasing number of studies points to the importance of the institutional settings (Murshed & 
Tadjoeddin, 2008). 
2.1. Explaining the Ivorian Conflict 
Despite much focus on the Ivorian civil conflict and many attempts to explain it, there is not much 
existing literature with a specific focus on the link between the introduction of multiparty democracy in 
1990 and the outbreak of armed conflict in 2002 and, only little of the literature professes clearly any 
theoretical framework on civil conflict. Nevertheless most of it does to a certain extent align with either 
a cultural approach or the greed and grievance model. 
Worth mentioning are the works of Bah (Bah, 2010) and Marshall-Fratini (Marshall-Fratini, 2006), who 
both choose a cultural approach. Marshall-Fratini aligns herself theoretically with Mann, in the sense 
that she, based on a constructionist perception of ethnicity and nationality, explains the conflict as the 
outcome of the ensuing issue of citizenship arising from the political liberalization in the early 1990s. 
Likewise Bah, who is mainly concerned with the solutions to the conflict, argues that the politicization of 
citizenship and ethnicity in connection with the democratization process is at the core of the conflict.  
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Among the scholars whose work lean more towards the grievance model are Akindès who has produced 
extensive works on the socio-economic features of the Ivorian society, explaining the conflict as the 
outcome of a combination of the social deprivation and the ethno-political responses of elites (Akindès, 
2004, 2009) and, Catherine Boone, who in her paper on electoral populism and property rights points to 
the role of patronage politics.  Boone makes a general argument that the issue of land rights is easily 
mobilized as a patronage resource, as rulers watch their other patronage powers contract. This makes 
the stakes in the elections inordinately high, as only the winner controls the land rights regime, which 
may lead the electoral loser to mobilize for violence (Boone, 2009). 
A common feature of all the above mentioned explanations of the Ivorian conflict is that, while they all 
in their particular ways deliver important insights to the nature of the Ivorian conflict, none of them 
provides us with a coherent framework to understand the conflict in its full complexity, and only brings 
us a little further in understanding the interrelation between the democratization process and the 
outbreak of armed conflict. The only existing study of the Ivorian conflict based on a coherent 
theoretical framework of the grievance model was carried by Arnim Langer. Langer bases his analysis on 
horizontal inequality theory and focuses on the interaction between the evolution of the horizontal 
inequalities at the elite level and socio-economic horizontal inequalities at the mass level, and he argues 
that the simultaneous presence of severe political horizontal inequalities at the elite level and socio-
economic horizontal inequalities at the mass level forms an explosive situation that facilitates violent 
mobilization (Langer, 2005). While Langer has added an institutional dimension to his grievance-based 
approach and, although it goes far in making a convincing argument about the causes of conflict, his 
approach still ignores many economic features of the Ivorian conflict. 
Within the last few years academics have increasingly turned their focus towards political settlement 
analysis. Evidence from such analyses suggest a link between the degree of exclusiveness or 
inclusiveness of a political settlement and the risk of violent conflict (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2008: 17) 
(Putzel & Di John, 2009: 5). Thereby political settlement analysis challenges the greed motive as 
explained earlier, but may work complementary to the grienvance and horizontal inequality approach. 
As mentioned, to contribute further to the understanding of the Ivorian conflict, this paper presents a 
political settlement analysis based on Mushtaq Khan’s conceptual framework. 
2.2 Khan’s Conceptual Framework 
In 1995, starting as a critique of the New Institutional Economics approach to identify the institutional 
causes of state failure, Khan introduced the assumption that performance is specific to the inherited 
political power of classes or groups subject to the institutions and, argued that an analysis of the 
political settlement is necessary to explain state failure (Khan, 1995). In the following years Khan 
developed and elaborated this approach by building a coherent conceptual framework to describe the 
political settlement. Most notably his working papers on the governance of growth-enhancing 
institutions (Khan, 2010) and his analysis of the political settlement in Bangladesh (Khan, 2011) 
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represent some of his most recent elaborations. As a political economist Khan’s primary focus is on 
economic development and economic institutions such as tax regimes and corruption for which his 
framework has proven useful (For examples, see (Khan, 2011) and (Therkildsen & Whitfield, 2011), but 
as Khan’s framework also describes political and bureaucratic institutions, it furthermore presents a 
useful framework for the study of how the introduction of democratic institutions affect the political 
settlement. In the following sections his conceptual framework will be presented in relation to 
democratic institutions and political stability. 
2.2.1. The Political Settlement: Stability and Crisis 
Khan describes the political settlement as a reproducible macro-political order which is sustained by the 
interaction between society’s organizations and institutional structures. His exact definition is that a 
political settlement is “a combination of institutions and a distribution of power between organizations 
that is reproducible over time” (Khan, 2011: 2, 20). In this definition institutions are understood as in 
institutional economics literature as “the rules that describe how social actors act” and, these rules can 
be formal as well as informal (Khan, 2011: 2). Organizations are the agencies that operate under these 
institutional rules, be they political, economic or bureaucratic and, they may operate within the formal 
institutional rules in society or, they may violate these rules (Khan, 2011: 4). 
In order to reflect the personalized and informal nature of political organization resulting from the 
informality of the economies and political organization in development countries, Khan calls the political 
settlements in these countries ‘clientelist’ (Khan, 2011: 26-27). This is opposed to the political 
settlement of most advanced countries, which have a ‘capitalist’ settlement characterized by the high 
level of alignment between the formal institutions and the interests of powerful economic organizations 
(Khan, 2011: 25). 
A political settlement is never static. This is because organizations are always mobilizing to change or 
modify institutions in their interests. All organizations, and political organizations in particular, must be 
sufficiently satisfied with the distribution of incomes and benefits to maintain a minimum level of 
political stability for social reproduction to continue. If the expectations of the organizations are not 
met, the unsatisfied institutions may turn to more radical means to protect their interests, which may 
result in increasing social conflict and mobilization that significantly affects the political stability (Khan, 
2011: 20). Usually attempts by powerful organizations to change the institutional rules will result in 
gradual changes to the political settlement and, in a new equilibrium between the interests supported 
by institutions and the relative power of organizations. 
The changes or modifications in the institutional rules that organizations pursue can be described as 
benefits, or in Khan’s terms ‘rents’ and, the activities that the organizations involve in to capture these 
rents is described by Khan as ‘rent-seeking’. Rent-seeking activities can range from anything from 
spending money on political activities to engaging in conflict or violence, and in developing countries it 
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often involves informal enforcement and redistributive activities through patron-client networks (Khan, 
2011: 4, 22-23, 38). The relative power of an organization and, thereby the potential effect of its rent-
seeking can be measured by its ‘holding power’. Holding power is described by Khan as being based on 
the ability of an organization to organize collective action, mobilize supporters, to absorb or inflict costs 
during conflicts, to mobilize ideologies to consolidate and keep members committed and to build 
alliances with other organizations. However, first and foremost holding power is based on economic 
power as its non-economic power can only be reproduced if the organization generates additional 
incomes for itself. Even so, the organizational capabilities should not be underestimated as they can 
sometimes outweigh economic power (Khan, 2011: 23). In that sense, rent-seeking is political activity 
with the primary goal of increasing the economic power of the organization, thereby increasing its 
holding power. To understand an organization’s ability to capture rents one must therefore examine the 
sources and strength of the organization’s holding power. 
The holding power of organizations is at the core of understanding the dynamics within the political 
settlement. If competing organizations agree in their assessment of their respective relative power, 
conflict is unlikely to occur, as the institutions will adapt to reflect the interests of the most powerful 
organizations. However, if competing organizations do not accept the distribution of rents as reflecting 
their relative power, conflict will arise, as conflict, according to Khan, is a mechanism for establishing a 
shared understanding of relative power and, a distribution of rents that is in line with the distribution of 
holding power (Khan, 2011: 23). In this respect one might argue that Khan’s understanding aligns to 
some extent with the feasibility hypothesis of the greed model. 
Khan describes the political settlement in terms of its ‘operational equilibrium’. A ‘strong operational 
equilibrium’ describes a political settlement in its most stable situation, with a close alignment of the 
distribution of rents and the relative power of the strongest organizations. In such a situation, the 
institutional order is not likely to face concerted challenges from organizations and the social order will 
be reproducible over many years. In the other end of the scale, a ‘weak operation equilibrium’ 
characterizes the most vulnerable political settlement where conflicts over the distribution of rents 
result in persistent high levels of conflict. In this case, the threat of a collapse of the social arrangements 
is present but, the institutional and organizational structure can still be counted as a political 
settlement. To stabilize the operational equilibrium the political settlement must be adjusted so that the 
distribution of rents is aligned with the power of the organizations. But this is not sufficient. In order to 
be reproducible a political settlement also needs to be economically viable, which is not necessarily a 
consequence of balance between the distribution of rents and the actual distribution of power. 
Likewise, a political settlement in weak operational equilibrium may persist with high level of violence if 
economically viable (Khan, 2011: 21, 24). 
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If as a consequence of conflict over the distribution of rents the formal institutions effectively collapse 
we have another type of political settlement which by Khan is termed a ‘political settlement in crisis’. In 
this situation the economic activity of society is carried out by informal organizations that use entirely 
informal methods to protect their activities. This may result in a war economy with a very high level of 
political violence. According to Khan, reproduction is no longer based on an operational equilibrium, but 
instead society is likely to be fragmented into a number of non-interactive parts engaged in conflict with 
other parts as in a civil war. Such a society can evolve in sudden non-incremental ways that may result in 
a viable political settlement, which is likely to become a variant of the clientelist political settlement 
(Khan, 2011: 27-28). 
2.2.2. Ruling Coalitions and Democracy 
A central feature of the clientelist political settlement is the personalized relations of patron-client 
networks that dominate the political system and, within which most rent-seeking takes place. These 
patron-client networks forms into pyramid constructions and, the pyramid which is topped by the 
members of the government is by Khan called the ‘ruling coalition’ (Khan, 2011: 38). Khan has identified 
four different types of such ruling coalition based on the vertical distribution of power within the ruling 
coalition and, the horizontal distribution of power between the ruling coalition and the excluded elite 
factions. These are labeled ‘Strong Patrimonialism’, ‘Vulnerable Patrimonialism’, ‘Constrained 
Patrimonialism’ and ‘Competitive Clientelism’. The different features of these four types of ruling 
coalitions have implications for the enforcement and operation of the formal institutions (Khan, 2011: 
38). The question is then, how does democratic institutions interplay with the types of ruling coalitions?  
According to Khan two of the ruling coalition types do not provide basis for a stable operational 
equilibrium with a political settlement based on democratic institutions. Those are ‘Strong 
Patrimonialism’ and ‘Vulnerable Patrimonialism (Khan, 2011: 37). Strong patrimonialism is signified by a 
ruling coalition with the power concentrated in the top levels and, with a weak excluded opposition. 
Because of the lack of serious challengers to the domination of the top levels, the ruling coalition is likely 
to remain in power for a long time span and it has a high capability of implementing its policies, which in 
turn is likely to result in high growth rates and a high level of legitimacy to the ruling coalition. 
Therefore, strong patrimonialism tends to align with authoritarian rule, but less so with democratic 
institutions. ‘Vulnerable partimonialism’ is also signified by a high concentration of power in the top 
levels of the ruling coalition, however it is challenged by a strong excluded opposition. The strength of 
the excluded opposition makes the ruling coalition vulnerable which in time increases the bargaining 
power of the lower levels that may be tempted to leave the ruling coalition and join the opposition. This 
results in a shorter time horizon for the ruling coalition, with lower implementation capabilities and a 
reduced likelihood of growth, as compared to a strong patrimonial ruling coalition. The institutions most 
likely to create a stable operational equilibrium in this context are repressive authoritarian ones. While 
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the ruling coalition will be likely to win in elections, the introduction of elections may increase the 
power of the lower levels which may result in a collapse of the operational equilibrium (Khan, 2011: 45). 
The two types of ruling coalitions that may work well with democratic institutions to establish a stable 
equilibrium are those of ‘Constrained Patrimonialism’ and ‘Competitive Clientelism’. Constrained 
patrimonialism is characterized by a ruling coalition faced with weak excluded elites but strong lower 
levels. Since the ruling coalition is not vulnerable to the excluded opposition it believes that its rule has a 
long time span, but the strength of the lower levels weakens its implementation capabilities and results 
in low growth rates that damages its legitimacy. ‘Constrained patrimonialism’ often revolves around a 
dominant party which will tend to pursue damaging rent-seeking strategies in order to satisfy its 
supporters. An operational equilibrium is most likely to be achieved either with authoritarian or 
democratic institutions, but if restrictive institutions becomes necessary for the ruling coalition to stay in 
power, the distribution of power is closer to resemble ‘vulnerable patrimonialism’ or a repressive 
version of ‘competitive clientelism’ as described below (Khan, 2011: 46). 
Competitive clientelism is a ruling coalition faced both with a strong excluded opposition and strong 
lower levels. This distribution of power makes an operational equilibrium difficult and, Khan argues that 
it is only achievable through the establishment of a system that ensures the cycling of elites in power, as 
no ruling coalition will be able to last for a long time. Therefore, democracy is ideal to ensure a stable 
equilibrium in a situation of competitive clientelism. However, due to the predominant role of informal 
institutions in developing countries, the success of democratic institutions in this setting requires 
informal institutional arrangements between competing elites to guarantee the excluded elites that 
power will rotate within a foreseeable future. However, the ruling coalition is often tempted to believe 
that it will be able to keep the opposition excluded with the help of the administrative powers that 
comes with incumbency, and therefore the ruling coalition may pursue authoritarian institutions in 
which case only a weak operational equilibrium evolves (Khan, 2011: 48). 
2.3. Analyzing the Political Settlement in Côte d’Ivoire 
Analyzing a political settlement is essentially an investigation into the distribution of power within 
society. It demands an analysis of complex and mutually interdependent factors and their interactions. 
Therefore, in order to understand the distribution of power in Côte d’Ivoire, this thesis will explore how 
the distribution of power affected the coalition building among elites and how these coalitions were 
maintained and the power distribution reproduced. It will also be examined which factors led to 
changes in the distribution of power and how the elites responded to those changes. Khan recommends 
that an analysis takes its’ start in the description of relative holding power of organizations within three 
subsystems that together explains the differences in the effectiveness of otherwise similar institutions 
across countries. These subsystems are: 1) the political subsystem, constituted by political organizations. 
2) The bureaucratic subsystem, defined as the public agencies, and 3) the economic subsystem which is 
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to say the productive organizations within society (Khan, 2011: 35-36). Given the specific features of the 
Ivorian society in the period under scrutiny, the bureaucratic subsystem remained primarily constructed 
to support the structures of the political subsystems, and given our special interest in the political 
institutions, the main focus in the thesis will be on the political subsystem but, the economic and 
bureaucratic subsystems will be examined as they all overlap. 
Two additional points will be suggested in order to fit Khan’s analytical framework to the Ivorian case 
and, to better address the issue of democratic institutions. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, as will be shown 
in the analysis, the challenges from excluded elites had little influence on the rent-seeking options of the 
ruling coalition. Instead conflicts within the top levels of the ruling coalition itself became decisive for 
the economic and political viability of the political settlement. According to Khan, such defections from 
the ruling coalition may occur under ‘constrained patrimonialism’ if it is difficult to change the 
leadership of the dominant party (Khan, 2011: 47). Thus, in order to examine such defections, with 
inspiration from Whitfield and Therkildsen, I will include an analysis of the horizontal distribution of 
power within the top levels of the ruling coalition by making use of Whitfield and Therkildsen’s concept 
of the ‘ruling elite’, defined as the “the political leaders atop the incumbent regime”, as opposed to the 
broader concept of ‘ruling coalition’, referring to the “groups and individuals behind the rise of the of the 
ruling elites to power and/or those groups or individuals who gave the ruling elites their support, 
typically in exchange for benefits” and which “serves the functions of keeping the ruling elite in power by 
organizing political support, often in the form of patron-client networks (Whitfield & Therkildsen, 2011: 
16).” Accordingly, when referring to ‘elites’ in general, they will be loosely defined as leaders atop of 
patron-client networks, excluded or participating in the ruling coalition alike. 
With regard to the consolidation of democratic institutions, Khan argues that competitive clientelism 
based on democratic institutions will  be in a stable operational equilibrium only if the ruling elite does 
not perceive itself sufficiently strong to keep competing coalitions excluded and, if all elite coalitions 
think the electoral results reflect the actual distribution of power between them (Khan, 2011: 50-52). 
However, to understand why repressive institutions evolve in a democratic setting and, how elites 
comes to misperceive their relative holding power we need to take Khan’s framework a little further by 
elaborating of his concepts of rent-seeking and holding power in the specific setting of multiparty 
democracy. 
In a context where political power is formally acquired within the framework of multiparty elections, 
voter mobilization becomes a central aspect of rent-seeking activities of elites. The ability of elites to 
mobilize voters is however determined by their holding power in terms of both economic and 
organizational capabilities. But, unlike Khan who only focuses on anticipated effects of rent-seeking, we 
need also to pay attention to the unanticipated side effects, as rent-seeking activities not only produces 
more holding power but, also limit the future rent-seeking strategies of an organization. For instance, 
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mobilizing on grievances along ethnically defined lines is a powerful strategy to mobilize support among 
one’s own ethnic group and, it demands little organizational or economic capability but, it is likely to 
make it difficult for the party to broaden its support base to elites or voters of competing ethnic groups. 
For political organizations lacking both the economic and organizational capabilities to win the elections, 
this strategy may however be tempting. Consequently, voter mobilization strategies require special 
attention in the analysis of the Ivorian political settlement during the years of democratization, as they 
affect the coalition building opportunities of elites. 
2.3.1. Methodological Approach 
Given the analytical concerns above, the methodological approach of the thesis is built on the analysis 
of vertical and horizontal analysis of the political, economic and bureaucratic subsystems as suggested 
by Khan, with the addition of analyzing conflicts and power distribution within the ruling elite, and the 
special considerations regarding the voter mobilizing strategies as discussed in the previous section. As 
it is not possible to isolate the impact of multiparty democracy from the effect of other institutions and 
organizations in the Ivorian society, the analysis will not aim to isolate the democratic institutions but 
rather to highlight how multiparty elections interplay with the other institutions and organizations in 
pushing the political settlement into crisis. 
Since political settlement analysis demands insights into a broad field of knowledge from the three 
subsystems mentioned above, it requires the existence and use of sufficient secondary studies, or in the 
absence of sufficient secondary literature to be supplemented by extensive knowledge based on a long 
period of studying and research in the country in question. However, if sufficient secondary sources do 
exist the analysis can be based entirely on these, as for example Khan’s analysis of the political 
settlement in Thailand. Making a satisfactory analysis of the political settlement is difficult in many 
African countries, due to the few secondary sources available to provide the necessary material. But 
thanks the country’s extraordinary post-colonial history of high economic growth rates and, decades of 
political stability followed by the unexpected descent into civil war, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyes the continuous 
attention of both Francophone and Anglophone scholars from a vast field of sciences. Therefore, the 
thesis is based entirely on secondary sources drawing on the existing literature. In order to facilitate that 
the analysis becomes as nuanced as possible, I have strived to apply a wide range of contributions from 
a variety of Anglophone and the Francophone scholars of a broad range of scientific disciplines such as 
political, economic and social sciences as well as recent anthropological studies. 
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4. The PDCI Hegemony 1960-1980 
Khan’s approach calls for a historical analysis of the institutions and the political settlement in order to 
understand the impact of the introduction of new institutions. From the time of independence and well 
into the 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire was effectively run as a single party state, controlled by the Parti 
democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) under the leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny. In this specific 
chapter, focus will be on what could be labeled the “golden age” of the PDCI, which is to say the time 
from around Côte d’Ivoire’s independence in 1960, and until the climax of PDCI’s political domination 
around 1980. 
4.1. Building the Ruling Coalition 
The characteristics of the ruling elite changed within the first 20 years of independence but, to 
understand the foundation on which the elite was built, one must look back at the historical origin of 
the PDCI and the social background of its leading members. The PDCI evolved from the Syndicat Agricole 
Africain (SAA) which was an association founded in 1944 by indigenous Ivorian plantation owners in 
Côte d’Ivoire to lobby for their interests, as opposed to those of the expatriate French plantation owners 
organized in Syndicat Agricole de la Côte d’Ivoire, whose special privileges were a threat to the 
profitability of the Ivoirians’ own plantations (Rapley, 1993: 44)4.  
The majority of the members of this new indigenous plantation owner class were former plantation 
labourers of modest backgrounds, who had gained insights into the French farming techniques, and 
used their acquired knowledge to establish plantations of their own. However former indigenous civil 
servants also invested in plantations. Most notably, the traditional indigenous elites – members of the 
chiefly families - (Felix Houphouêt-Boigny being one of the few representatives of this class) engaged in 
this new source of income only to a smaller extent (Rapley, 1993: 29). The new elite that emerged 
within the PDCI fused their economic and political power in a way that was entirely alien to the 
traditional, pre-colonial Ivorian societies. Therefore, the ruling elite within the PDCI that took power in 
1960, was a product of the colonial era – a new kind of elite, that did not spring from the traditional 
ruling classes (Bakary, 1984: 26). 
Since  the policies of promoting migration as well as the land tenure policy of the PDCI were 
undermining the authority and traditional source of power of the chiefs, who had until then been 
controlling the distribution of land rights at the local level, and since the traditional elite of chiefs had 
not to any significant extent taken part in the coffee and cocoa plantation industry that had given rise to 
the new elite of the PDCI, a growing dichotomy evolved between the two groups, and in the years prior 
to the independence the PDCI started supplanting the institutions of the colonial regime, including the 
chiefly institutions. Upon independence the PDCI was committed to the construction of a political, 
                                                          
4
 The colonial government’s preferential treatment of the French plantation owners provided the French with 
access to cheaper wage-labourers than was the case of the Ivorian plantation owners. Thus, the Ivorian plantation 
owners found it increasingly difficult to compete with the French. 
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institutional framework immune to pressures of regionalism, whether based on religion or ethnic 
conflict. According to Boone, this goal was to create a near absence of political life at the local level. This 
was achieved by what Boone calls an administrative occupation of the South, meaning that all political 
authority was extremely centralized, and that the administrative and political apparatus was heavily 
concentrated at the center.  Such de-politicization on the regional level was possible because the local 
elites from the start were weak. In the southern forest zone of Côte d’Ivoire the chiefly institutions were 
not in existence prior to the colonization, but introduced by the French to support their administration 
of the country (Fauré & Médard, 1982: 131), thus the legitimacy of the chiefs, that constituted the local 
elites were limited from the start. Their close affiliation with the French had left the traditional elite with 
few supporters when the French left, and afraid of being abolished all together, they did not dare to 
engage in an open confrontation with the new regime. Instead the chiefs either accepted their loss of 
influence or worked to build up their influence from within the PDCI party framework (Zolberg, 1969: 
286-289). In other words, they simply did not have the holding power necessary to resist an 
“administrative occupation”. 
In regions where the local elites had deeper cultural roots and therefore more local backing and 
legitimacy, such attacks on the power base of the traditional elite did not go unchallenged, and during 
the early days of independence the new PDCI elite was confronted with pressures from several 
traditional regional elites. A case in point was the Agnis who despised the way the migration of Ehotilé 
was undermining their own dominant position in the Southeastern corner of Côte d’Ivoire. In this area 
the political organization of the chiefs and the Agnis was particularly strong, and in 1959, before 
independence they sent a delegation to Paris to lobby for a separate Sanwi state while at the same time 
establishing an exile government in neighboring Ghana. Their claim had historical substance but was 
dismissed and the members of the delegation imprisoned (Zolberg, 1969: 294). The separatist strategy 
of the Agni chiefs turned out to be a costly affair for the Agnis, as in the following decade their leaders 
were effectively excluded from political influence and the Agnis left with no influential patrons closely 
connected with the party top or the government until the Agni leaders were eventually integrated into 
the PDCI when the government’s policy towards them changed as they were no longer considered to 
pose a threat to the PDCI hegemony (Boone, 2003: 233). 
However, the biggest challenge to the emerging ruling coalition came from the North5 where the 
situation was somewhat different from the southern regions. Due to stronger hierarchical structures 
within the traditional societies of the North, the traditional chiefs of the northern regions had a stronger 
constituency that secured them the holding power necessary to resist a similar attempt of 
administrative occupation in their regions (Boone, 2003: 243). Boone identifies two changes in the state 
building strategy pursued by the PDCI elite in the North: In the last years of colonial rule, the PDCI was 
                                                          
5
 Boone’s analysis is based on the Senoufo region, which makes up the demographic core of the Northern half of 
Côte d’Ivoire (Boone, 2003: 243). 
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opposed to the northern chiefs as they had been allied with the French against the PDCI, so from the 
1950s to the early 1970s the PDCI government attempted a strategy similar to the strategy pursued in 
the south of administrative occupation. However, the traditional chiefs were able to obstruct the PDCI’s 
attempts to increase tax earnings in the North, and from the 1970s the PDCI government changed its 
strategy. Instead, an alliance was built between the Akan dominated PDCI and the northern chiefs 
whose leading clans took over the local party structures in the North (Boone, 2003: 244-245). In other 
words, the holding power of the northern elites was so strong, that the exclusion of them proved too 
costly for the PDCI elite. Thus, from the 1960s the ruling coalition was built on an axis between the 
northern traditional leaders and Houphouët-Boigny and his own ethnic group, the Baoulé, a subgroup of 
the Akan. 
However, while this axis made up the cornerstone in the ruling coalition and prevented a North-South 
divide, Houphouët-Boigny furthermore pursued a policy of ethnic quotas, which insured representation 
of all ethnic groups, more or less proportionate to the size of the group, in the top positions within the 
party agencies. This is evident from data collected by Langer: by focusing on the ethnic composition of 
the top level decision-making organs, he concludes that under the rule of Houphouët-Boigny all ethnic 
groups were represented more or less in proportion to their respective sizes. Though the PDCI elite was 
itself a cross-ethnic elite, and despite the fact that Houphouët-Boigny consciously tried to balance the 
ethnic composition of the party leadership, the economic policy accentuated regional economic 
imbalances. A ratio of seven-to-one for average income between the South and North was estimated in 
1981(Woods, 1988: 105). 
4.1.1. Elite Rent-Seeking 
Once in power, the PDCI government launched a development policy with growth as the main drive 
behind a transformation of the Ivorian economy from being based on agriculture to one based on the 
industry. To make this transformation, huge investments in industry were needed, and since the 
emerging Ivorian capitalist class did not yet possess the capital needed for that kind of investments, the 
government economic policies relied on two other sources of capital: 1) the rents from the Ivorian cocoa 
and coffee sector and 2) foreign investment primarily in the import substitution industrial sector 
(Alemayehu, 1997: 115)(Hecht, 1983: 25).  
In order to attract foreign investment the government was keen to create favourable conditions for 
foreign investors, and foreign capital remained in a dominant position in all industrial sectors 
throughout the period (Mytelka, 1996: 151). In the import substitution sector foreign capital made up 
80 per cent of the total capital (Alemayehu, 1997: 115) and in 1996 Berthelemy still wrote that French 
interest owned no less than 40 per cent of the capital in the private sector (Berthelemy, 1996: 14). 
Nevertheless, the goal of making the industrial sector the motor of development was not achieved. In 
spite of the huge public investments in the industrial sector, it never became sustainable, but remained 
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dependent on financial resources from outside (Alemayehu, 1997: 146). This was due to a number of 
reasons. First of all, there was a lack of up and down linkages between the agricultural and industrial 
sector leaving the industrial production dependent on imported resources. The industry created few 
employment opportunities and the import substitution industry was faced with too small a domestic 
market, which was a result of a the narrow concentration of income in the Ivorian society, and a middle 
class preferring expensive imported goods (Alemayehu, 1997: 146-147). In the export sector processed 
and semi-processed raw materials and agricultural products dominated. In 1980 fruit canning, the 
processing of cocoa and coffee, wood and timber made up only 12 per cent of the output of the modern 
industrial sector, but no less than 41.5 per cent of the country’s total exports. The value added in the 
agro-processing industries was less than 30 per cent (Berthelemy, 1996: 34-35). The government 
supported a diversification of the agricultural sector away from cocoa and coffee into new crops. Initially 
they succeeded with cotton, banana, palm oil, pineapple and rubber. However, the success did not alter 
the structural problems of the Ivorian economy for more than one reason: Côte d’Ivoire simply did not 
have the comparative advantage in these products and therefore it was impossible to sustain the high 
market share that it initially enjoyed6. Simultaneously there was a decline in demand vis-à-vis world 
supply. The new sectors were also suffering from mismanagement and in some projects the profitability 
was low, as they had been introduced for socio-political reasons7, rather than for sound economic ones 
(Alemayehu, 1997: 121). Consequently, the Ivorian economy remained heavily dependent of the cocoa 
and coffee rents throughout the period from 1960 to 1980.  In 1960, the export of cocoa, coffee and 
timber made up a share in the total Ivorian export of 84.5 per cent, in 1978, the same three products 
amounted for 75.2 percent of the total export. Measured against the country’s total GDP this 
corresponds to 24.1 per cent in 1960 and 24.5 per cent in 1978 (Hecht, 1983: 27-29). 
The export of the Ivorian smallholders’ production of cocoa and coffee had become the engine behind 
the Ivorian economy already in the colonial era. It was also from the colonial regime, which had 
introduced the crop in Côte d’Ivoire, that the PDCI government inherited its agricultural policy. The 
production had taken its beginning in the Southeast corner of the country, but the farmers soon started 
moving westward cutting down rainforest in order to take new virgin land into use, thereby increasing 
the national outcome. The development was promoted by the French with the introduction of the ‘mise 
en valuer’ policy, which basically meant, that anyone who took new land into use could rightfully claim it 
                                                          
6
 For instance, the Ivorian pineapple sector’s share in the European market dropped from an impressive 93 per 
cent in 1985, to 50 per cent in 2000. The production of pineapple for canning collapsed in the 1980s, due to Asian 
competition, was then revived as fresh fruit production in the 1990s, only to experience a new collapse in the mid-
2000s, this time due to competition from Costa Rica (Colin, 2010: 1, 3, 13). 
7
 SODESUCRE (sugar production), SODERIZ (rice production) are both examples of poorly planned projects, 
primarily designed to provide sources of income to the underdeveloped North, and only secondarily to increase 
food production. In the SODESUCRE programme, for instance, the government invested in the creation of irrigated 
sugar plantations and factories destined to produce sugar at costs above projected world market prices. 
Furthermore, the government encouraged mismanagement of the money and in 1982 alone over-billing wiped out 
the entire value added of the company – approximately 10 billion CFA Francs (Widner, 1993: 39)(Gbetibouo & 
Delgado, 1984: 139). 
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as his. In this way Ivorian peasants penetrated into the rainforest of the west and south west creating a 
pioneer frontier and a cocoa and coffee production dominated by smallholders, who either cut their 
own piece of land out of the forest, bought the land by less entrepreneurial land owners, or rented small 
plots from these. By continuing the strategy of forest clearing and the promotion of migration 
throughout the 1960s the state had secured increasing output simply by replication of smallholders 
(Woods, 1999: 490) (Boone, 2003: 217). 
While the actors in the cocoa and coffee sector were purely private, the PDCI regime set up a 
stabilization fund La caisse de la stabilisation (CAISTAB) to assist and regulate every aspect of it.  The 
production was taken care of by private smallholders and plantation owners, who sold their produce to 
private buyers who had obtained licenses to buy the produce at a farm-gate price decided by the 
CAISTAB. Again, when reselling to the exporters the produce was sold at a fixed price decided by the 
CAISTAB. In this way, with firmly controlled prices, the CAISTAB was able to capture the surplus between 
the world commodity prices and the prices received by the local traders. The system was intended to 
absorb price fluctuations, thereby ensuring the farmers a predictable and stable income, while the 
CAISTAB was able to accumulate a large surplus from the exports (Woods, 1999: 491). The real prices 
that the peasants received for their products from 1960-1979 were constant despite the fact that the 
global prices were rising (Hecht, 1983: 39). In fact, in 1977, the CAISTAB took as much as three fourths of 
the actual export prices and kept it in its coffins, returning only around 25 per cent to the peasants, 
paying the peasants $1 a kilogram, while selling it on the world market for $3.62 a kilogram for coffee 
and $5.00 per kilogram of cocoa (Hecht, 1983: 30). Ideally the surplus should be kept in reserve for years 
with low world prices in which case the CAISTAB would secure the income of the peasants who would 
then receive more than the world market prices. In reality though, much of the surplus was spent on 
investment in infrastructure and industrial investments (Rapley, 1993: 107). 
Considering the fact that Côte d’Ivoire in this period accounted for approximately 25 per cent of the 
world production of cocoa, the surplus left for CAISTAB was substantial. Thus, the income from CAISTAB 
was by far the Ivorian state’s most important source of revenue (McGovern, 2011: 137). Indeed, 
between 1976 and 1980 CAISTAB received approximately 50 per cent of all government receipts 
(Bethélemy & Bourguignon, 1997: 16). The accounts of CAISTAB escaped normal budgeting procedures 
(Bethélemy & Bourguignon, 1997: 16), and one of the most important aspects of the CAISTAB was the 
core function it served within the PDCI patronage system. As the revenues from CAISTAB were 
practically under the direct and sole control of Houphouët-Boigny (Berthélemy & Bourguignon, 1996: 
12-13), he was able to build up a patronage system, redistributing the cocoa and coffee rents to loyal 
supporters, through an increasing number of channels of distribution within the public sector and the 
party. With the control of the cocoa and coffee rents, Houphouët-Boigny managed to control not just 
the development of the public sector, but the power distribution within the ruling elite itself, securing a 
highly coherent and integrated ruling elite. 
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The huge rents accumulated in the CAISTAB were used to finance many other things as well, such as the 
payment of foreign debt, investments in infrastructure, civil service and education, construction 
projects, and the funding of a rising amount of public enterprises. In this way, one of the main functions 
of the CAISTAB revenues was to fund projects to support the government policy of industrialization. This 
task was primarily carried out through the establishment of public enterprises. These were initially 
established with the goal of building infrastructure and provide technical support for the agricultural 
sector, or they were constructed as joint ventures with foreign investors focused on production for 
consumer markets. But from the mid-1970s public enterprises were furthermore created to operate 
directly in the markets8. By the end of the 1970s the number of public enterprises amounted to 30 fully 
owned by the state, and 50 owned by the state in a joint venture, often with foreign investors9. These 
enterprises made up a considerable share of the modern sector. In fact, in 1982 the public sector made 
up no less than 55.8 per cent of the entire modern sector (Berthélemy & Bourguignon, 1996: 22-23). 
For the ruling elite, the economic policies provided opportunities of rent-seeking along two different 
paths: through private investments in the modern sector, and by the capture of rents through lucrative 
positions in the public sector. Both options redirected the attention of the elite further away from its 
original base of power, the agricultural production, and towards urban and industrial investments. The 
policies and the public enterprises supported the expansion of the public sector, which provided young 
elites with new opportunities to acquire profitable positions. For instance, in 1962 the Societé nationale 
de financement was founded to assist the development of local enterprises and encourage local 
investment in the industrial sector and away from real estate and agriculture (Rapley, 1994: 69). 
Furthermore Rapley suggests that the general redistribution of resources via CAISTAB from the rural 
sector to the industrial, is an indication that the government pursued a policy of capital accumulation, 
that served the interests of an urban based dominant class (Woods, 1988: 100) (Rapley, 1993: 69). The 
number of urban investors caused the role of the planters in Ivorian capitalism to decline in significance. 
In the early 1970s, planters accounted for only 10 percent of the investment in new industrial 
corporations, and a few years later they bought only 5 percent of the shares being sold on the Abidjan 
Stock Exchange (Rapley, 1993: 104). Later, as new generations of academics pushed for access to the 
top levels of the PDCI, they were given positions within the bureaucracy as technocrats, but as they also 
privately invested in industrial investments, it further blurred the picture of whether the ruling elite was 
constituted by capitalists or bureaucrats. In essence, the power of the ruling elite within the PDCI had its 
origin in this new class of indigenous plantation owners, but their rent-seeking behavior changed upon 
accession to power and shifted the institutionalisation of rents distribution from the cocoa and coffee 
sector into the industrial sector. 
                                                          
8
 For instance SODESUCRE in the sugar sector, and SODEPALM in the palm oil industry. 
9
 It varied whether the state held a majority share in these joint ventures, but even when it did, it often acted as a 
minority shareholder as the enterprise depended on the know-how delivered by the foreign investors. 
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4.2. Intra-Elite Conflicts 
Due to the relative novelty of the new PDCI elite that grew out of the indigenous plantation owners in 
the last decades of colonial rule, the elite was still in the phase of establishing itself in the period under 
question in this chapter. This allowed men from outside the elite families to join the elite. The most 
common access point was through higher education. University graduates were recruited through 
clientelist networks, where younger clients achieved positions within the party or the administration 
with the help of their older and more influential patrons (Toungara, 1995: 14). Since most aspiring 
youths came from modest backgrounds, and therefore depended on their patrons for their income, the 
younger clients served their older patrons loyally in anticipation of receiving more favorable positions in 
return. In this fashion, during the first 20 years after independence, university graduates could expect 
access to profitable positions within the state if they stayed loyal to the PDCI regime. Having obtained 
such a position, one could further expand one’s own access to rents and power by engaging in 
businesses and marriages with other members of the elite (Rapley, 1993: 109). However, the 
recruitment of younger generations did not avoid contributing to some generational tensions within the 
ruling elite, but to some extent these tensions were lessened by two factors: first of all, at the dawn of 
independence the retreat of the colonial administrators left positions within the bureaucracy available 
to Ivoirians, and secondly, the general expansion of the public enterprises was able to meet the growing 
demand for jobs. For as long as the revenues from the export of cocoa and coffee secured the financing 
of the patronage system, the ability of the ruling elite to integrate these new generations of university 
graduates was intact, and the control of the political, bureaucratic and economic institutions likewise. 
However, serious generational conflicts did develop. The elders within the party opposed efforts of 
widening the decision-making base within the party, which would weaken their own control of the party 
to the advantage of the younger ‘reformers’10 (Tougara, 1995: 17). While the access to power was a part 
of the conflict it was further intensified by the elders distrust based on ideological issues towards the 
younger generation. These younger aspiring elites, who Toungara labels ‘the reformers’, and many of 
whom had been studying in France under the influence of western liberal thought, were more inclined 
to democratic ideals, than were the elders within the party. As a result, in 1963 Houphouët-Boigny 
staged a ‘faux plot’ bringing to trial a large number of elites on the accusation of plotting against the 
government. The trials were a scam for Houphouët-Boigny to get rid of younger elites who through their 
positions within the public enterprises had been building up their own private clientelist networks, 
which could potentially threaten Houphouët-Boigny’s control of the ruling elite. Still, eight years later, 
Houphouët-Boigny publicly declared, that no youth would be allowed within the top political agencies. 
They were only to be given technocratic positions. 
                                                          
10
 Toungara distinguishes between four groupings of different political alignment within the PDCI. ‘The reformers’ 
was a grouping of PDCI party members who entered the political realm in the 1960s and 1970s advocating to open 
the party organs to a more diverse selection of the population, as opposed to the more conservative ‘Anciens’ of 
the first generation of party bosses (Toungara, 1995). 
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The exclusion of younger elites from the top political positions within the party and the government 
resulted in an exceptional political longevity within the ruling elite (Bakary, 1984: 44). But the relatively 
large inflow of younger clients with a university degree into the elite, and the fact that these younger 
generations were predominantly placed in technocratic positions slowly changed the social composition 
of the ruling elite. These new generations did not base their wealth on the ownership of plantations but, 
first and foremost on the rents available to them in their technocratic positions in the public enterprises. 
Secondly, they further sought to capture rents through investments in the industrial sector that was so 
heavily sponsored by the state itself. 
4.3. Vertical Power-Sharing 
While for the elite the government’s policies presented new opportunities of rent-seeking, the outcome 
of the government’s economic policies, served only for the farmers to gain a small share in the ‘Ivorian 
Miracle’ (Hecht, 1983: 40). Still, for the cocoa and coffee farmers, the CAISTAB system secured the 
farmers a stable and predictable income and despite the low returns they received for their products, 
the consistent increases of producer prices gave them an image of a positive price movement (Hecht, 
1983: 31). Indeed, one could argue that all social categories – including the small-holder peasant – had 
an interest in the system, as all - although to varying degrees – benefitted from it (Bach, 1982: 102). As 
Widner points out, funds from the CAISTAB were also spent on infrastructure such as road building in 
the countryside that was of benefit to the agricultural sector. In this perspective, the CAISTAB system 
represented a mutual understanding between the peasants and the elite.  To a large degree Houphouët-
Boigny could count on the loyalty of the peasants, since it was he, who had gotten forced labor 
abolished in the last years of the colonial era, an accomplishment that had in most Ivoirians’ eyes given 
Houphouët-Boigny an aura of a national father figure and a hero, and the loyalty of the peasants was on 
several occasions demonstrated in peasant protests against the teachers and students when they went 
on strike (Bakary, 1984: 54). 
After all, sources of discontent with the regime, were not to be found in the CAISTAB system, but in the 
structural problems following on from the organization of the cocoa and coffee production, and the 
government’s mise en valeur policy: the labour opportunities created by the cocoa and coffee 
production attracted immigrants from poorer African countries as well as seasonal labourers from the 
Savannah regions of northern Côte d’Ivoire, thereby drastically changing the demographics in the cocoa 
and coffee belt and  creating frustrations among the indigenous ethnic groups in the plantation regions, 
who suffered from an ‘internal colonization’ and found themselves becoming minorities in their own 
areas (McGovern, 2011: 79-81). For instance in Gagnoa in 1998 the indigenous Gban ethnic group made 
up only 22.4 per cent of the population, while Baoulé immigrants made up no less than 33.2 per cent 
and non-Ivorian, Burkanabés  31.7 per cent of the population (McGovern, 2011: 76-78). The group which 
benefitted from the promotion of cocoa and coffee production especially was primarily the Akan ethnic 
group, especially the Akan sub-group of the Baoulé, who had been among the first to be exposed to the 
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French and therefore also the first indigenous group to engage in the cocoa and coffee production. It 
was this group that started penetrating west ward into the forest. But the immigrating wage labourers 
from the north and from abroad also benefitted significantly, as the government awarded them 
extensive civil rights11 within the Ivorian state. Consequently, ethnic tensions ran high in communities of 
the forest zone and, to make matters worse, the indigene-stranger cleavage sometimes ran along class-
like divisions. This was the case in much of the Southwest, where the largest farmers and landholders 
tended to be strangers. It was also true in parts of the East, where large Agni planters were landlords 
and where immigrants could find themselves exploited, politically marginalized at the village level, or 
both (Boone 2003: 229). 
Having established a framework for a cross-ethnic ruling elite, the task of the PDCI was therefore to 
create a political system where such ethnic tensions at the mass level as mentioned above would not 
supplant themselves into the lower level agencies of the ruling coalition and thereby threaten the 
political settlement all together. For this purpose a structure of tight political and administrative control 
from the top level through allocation and redistribution of cocoa and coffee rents was established as a 
means to make the lower level agencies completely dependent on state patronage connections. As a 
result, the efficiency of government control did not leave much room for political life at the local level, a 
situation that led Hecht to call the peasantry “politically impotent” (Hecht, 1983: 26). Indeed, the regime 
of the PDCI was based on an odd mixture of authoritarianism and liberalism. The liberal economic policy 
secured the inflow of money to financially support a system of patronage, which on its side, supported 
the central government’s authoritarian control of all levels of society (Médard, 1982: 62). Through this 
system of patronage networks, leaders of all kinds, from ethnic, to military and bureaucratic leaders 
depended financially on the support from PDCI, whose leaders distributed the wealth of society to the 
people who served the regime loyally (Médard, 1982: 76). Access to rents was solely based on loyalty to 
the ruling elite and the PDCI. 
This was evident in all three subsystems of the Ivorian society. Not least in the bureaucratic subsystem. 
The regional administration was divided into prefectures and sub-prefectures. To secure the local civil 
administrations immunity towards regional demands, the ruling elite made sure that the civil servants 
were completely dependent on the ruling elite economically as well as for employment.  On top of that, 
a heavy use of French civil servants in the administration, helped to isolate the state against ethnic 
conflicts, as the French were naturally unconcerned about those issues, making the Ivorian bureaucracy 
highly effective (Crook, 1991: 224). The bureaucrats’ dependency on the government resulted in a highly 
effective state with strong implementation capabilities, and in the first decades of the PDCI rule, the 
governments’ developmental policies were implemented to an extent rarely seen elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa, where developmental plans were unlikely to be turned into reality (Rapley, 1993: 67). 
                                                          
11
 All foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed the right to vote in national elections. 
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In the economic subsystem, due to the CAISTAB price system, the farmers were left economically weak, 
and with no economic power of significance. But as the system also left the peasants immune to falling 
market prices, they had no incentive to experiment with new crops or new products. Although the 
government did not seem to be concerned about increasing the output of the individual smallholder, 
some measures were taken to promote a modernization of the rural sector, but again strongly 
controlled from above. A considerable part of the surplus from the CAISTAB was invested in the 
establishment of public enterprises producing a variety of products such as fruit, sugar, rubber, palm oil 
and rice. The public enterprises were intended to promote and transfer modern techniques to the 
peasants and, as a link between the public enterprises and the peasants, rural cooperatives were 
established (Woods, 1999:491-492). However, these public enterprises and the cooperatives did not 
primarily serve the purpose of the ordinary peasant, but were used by a small group of producers with 
good connections within the state administration to obtain access to resources that was denied other 
less well connected peasants (Woods, 1999: 499). Furthermore, the public enterprises were closely 
connected to private enterprises, and they often took over the management of the cooperatives and 
attempted to dictate their objectives on the cooperatives, and in the end this only led to further burden 
the individual producer with more expenses (Woods, 1999: 496). For instance in the case of SODEFEL12 
all production was managed and regulated by SODEFEL staff, the grower only bringing in his labour 
force, thereby reducing the grower to a de facto wage labourer (Colin, 2010: 3). 
In the political subsystem, the decision-making agencies in Côte d’Ivoire were all placed within the 
sphere of the PDCI, the most powerful agencies being the Political Bureau, which was the executive 
agency of the PDCI with only half a dozen of members including the president and the Secretary General 
of the party; the Party Congress - in principle the superior agency of the party, with the power to 
regroup the party organisation13 , and the Executive Committee14 which included members of the higher 
party agencies plus a few deputees of the National Assembly and some ministers. While the National 
Assembly played a secondary role in the decision-making process, this was the only major agency which 
was under electoral scruntiny, as the deputies were elected through legislative elections held every five 
years. In reality though, the secretary general of the PDCI made a list of candidates which was then 
approved by the Political Bureau (Médard, 1982: 64-69). With only one candidate in each constituency, 
there was no public competition in the run for office and in addition to this practice the ruling elite 
made sure never to chose candidates who were already well known within the region they were chosen 
by, thereby securing not only that the deputees of the national assembly were immune to local 
demands of their constituency, but also making it impossible for the deputees to built up a personal 
powerbase in the their constituency (Bakary, 1984: 38). 
                                                          
12
 Société d’état pour le développement de la production des fruits et légumes en Côte d’Ivoire 
13
 The Congress rarely met but was permanently representated by a National Council. 
14
 My own translation of Comité directeur. 
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While the formal political system in this fashion was under tight central control, the real test of strength 
between the PDCI top and the lower level agents of the ruling coalition took place in the sphere of local 
associational life. Since the 1920s there had been a strong associational tradition in the Ivorian 
countryside centered in ethnic associations and home town associations. These associations were 
mainly based on ethnic identification, though in principle they represented local developmental 
interests within a given area across ethnic boundaries (Woods, 1994: 466). Houphouët-Boigny 
considered the ethnic associations as a threat to his political control, partly because he was aware how 
dangerous ethnic interests in itself could potentially be to political stability, and partly since the 
associations were used by factions within the elite to mobilize support that was, in its nature, not under 
the control of the PDCI (Zolberg, 1969: 296). Therefore, in an attempt to cut off this source of political 
power, the ethnic subcommittees were banned in 1963 (Woods, 1994: 467). Instead the PDCI sought to 
absorb the local associations and by doing so, limit the participation in the political life. In substitution of 
the ethnically based associations the regime attempted to reorganize the masses into a quasi-cooperate 
system of syndicates and labour unions closely tied to – or even sponsored by - the PDCI, and based on 
social classes, thereby creating an alternative organizational structure to the traditional ethnic ones 
(Woods, 1994: 468)(Widner, 1994a: 159). The integration of the home-town associations into the PDCI 
was carried out successfully, but still, the PDCI did not succeed in destroying the ethnic ties, and instead 
by the mid 1970s a new strategy of establishing home town associations on the principle of ethnic 
solidarity was introduced (Woods, 1994: 470). At this point, Houphouët-Boigny had gained complete 
control over the party and the state apparatus. According to Woods, Houphouët-Boigny was by then 
“the principal determinant behind elite circulation and upward mobility” (Woods, 1994: 470). 
Apparently, under these circumstances he felt that the costs of allowing these associations were less 
than the costs of repressing them.  Now the regime perceived the home town associations as a tool to 
control the countryside politically (Woods, 1994: 469), and aspiring new elites were rewarded with 
political positions and access to sources of income for establishing such associations and - not least – for 
keeping them under control and settle any ethnic conflicts that might occur (Woods, 1994: 471). In 
other words, the hometown associations also came to serve as a channel of the urban based elite’s 
control of the local political activities. 
However, as Woods argues, the home town associations, after being absorbed by the PDCI allowed for a 
certain level of reciprocity between rulers and the ruled, insofar as the associations on the one hand 
served as a lobbying organization drawing on its patronage connections within the elite, and on the 
other hand provided a tool to influence the distribution of resources allocated to the home town 
(Woods, 1994: 470-471). Arguably, this co-option gave at least some peasants access to channels of 
influence, as in the case of the home town associations. But while the new home town associations 
were officially built on ethnic solidarity, they were in fact dominated by specific ethnic groups, and the 
atomized ethnic character of the peasant groups limited their power even further (Woods, 1988: 109). 
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Other examples of associational life highlight the extremely limited capacity of the peasantry to resist 
pressure from the government, such as in the case of the rural co-operatives, which served more as a 
source of income to private investors, and a taxation of the peasants, than as a vehicle of agricultural 
technological development. 
The only elites that the regime did not manage to integrate into the PDCI or repress were the teachers. 
In the 1960s the teachers organized themselves into the Syndicat National de la Recherche et de 
l’Enseignement Superior (SYNARES) and the Syndicat National de l’Enseignement Secondaire en Côte 
d’Ivoire (SYNESCI) counting over 40,000 members collectively. Ironically, the holding power of those 
groupings was rooted in the privileged treatment they enjoyed from the government as a consequence 
of the PDCI’s progressive educational policies. In 1965 education was proclaimed a national priority by 
the government which resulted in benefits such as attractive salary scales and free housing for teachers, 
while students enjoyed medical coverage as civil servants. Consequently, in the 1980s the state spent no 
less than 40 per cent of the national budget on education (Woods, 1996: 114-116). A third association, 
Syndicat National de l’Enseignement Primaire Public de Côte d’Ivoire (SNEPP)had existed since the early 
1950, but had not escaped the co-option into the PDCI, and it therefore did not constitute an 
oppositional organization (Woods, 1996: 114). Contrary to SNEPP both the SYNARES and the SYNESCI 
avoided the regime’s attempt of co-option and became the only open challengers of the PDCI hegemony 
in the period in question.  
Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI regarded the refusal of these two organizations as a threat towards his 
political control – and rightfully so. Woods writes that the teachers occupied a strategic, but precarious 
role in most African countries, since this group on the one side is connected to the ruling class who turn 
to them to legitimate their rule, but on the other side they make up a fragile middle class, since they 
depend on the government’s spending on education (Woods, 1996: 113). But the contradictions 
between the ruling elite and the teachers went deeper than sheer class identification. The conflicts had 
its root from before independence, in the pragmatic policy of Houphouët-Boigny in the question of 
Ivorian relations to France. Already in 1958, when the PDCI campaigned against full Ivorian 
independence from France15, the Federation of African Students in France branded Houphouët-Boigny 
as a traitor (Zolberg, 1969: 227). The conflict was further consolidated with the PDCI economic policies 
that favored French business interests in Côte d’Ivoire, and especially, when in the years following 
independence, the regime hesitated to replace the French expatriates working in the top offices of the 
Ivorian bureaucracy with indigenous Ivoirians. By keeping a predominance of French civil servants within 
the public administration, the regime was able to keep the administration under its control as well as 
isolated from ethnic demands, but at the same time it limited the number of jobs available to the 
                                                          
15
 In 1958 Houphouët-Boigny, convinced that Côte d’Ivoire could not insure by its own means a decent standard of 
living for the entire population, campaigned for a ’Yes’ to Côte d’Ivoire’s membership of the French Community, 
thereby rejecting full independence (Zolberg, 1969: 235). 
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Ivoirians. The teachers and the students kept pushing for an Ivorianization of the civil service, but while 
other former French colonies in Africa were busy getting rid of the French civil servants (Woods, 1996: 
116), the Ivorian government was reluctant to replace them with Africans (Zolberg, 1969: 299). But the 
conflict was not confined to the question of africanisation of the civil service only. The teachers also 
publicly criticized the government’s socio-economic policies. The issues of conflict varied from the 
practice of large classroom enrollments, the content of education and to the regime’s overall economic 
policies (Woods, 1996: 117). The tensions between the teachers and the regime worsened, when in 
1970 the SYNARES and the SYNESCI turned down the PDCI’s invitation to join the party congress. This 
led to the imprisonment and persecution of the syndicate leaders, but nevertheless, the syndicates 
managed to maintain their independence from the PDCI (Woods, 1996:117). 
In general the institutional framework created by the PDCI and the ruling elite resulted in a very strong 
top level control of the ruling coalition with high implementation capabilities. This framework combined 
with the socioeconomic realities of the Ivorian society did not leave much initiative or holding power to 
the lower level agents. Only in its pursuit of regrouping the population along social classes instead of by 
ethnic lines did the implementation capabilities of the ruling elite reach its limits. In the cases where the 
elite acquisition of control met resistance, this resistance was ultimately met with violent suppression. 
Only in the case of the Northern traditional elite did the Akan dominated elite meet opponents with 
such holding powers, that the elite found it less costly to adjust the political settlement rather than 
excluding the northerners. The only group that throughout the period maintained it resistance to the 
PDCI coalition and which did not succumb was the teachers. Ironically this elite gained its resources of 
holding power from the ruling elite itself, through wages and huge investments in the educational 
sector, and it was this high priority of the educational sector that provided the teachers with the holding 
power to absorb the repeated onslaughts on them. 
4.4. Political Settlement 1960-1980 
Thanks to the control of cocoa and coffee rents in the hands of Houphouët-Boigny personally, he and 
the rest of the ruling elite were able to build a very centralized ruling coalition with the power firmly 
concentrated in the top levels, as all lower level agents depended entirely on rents distributed from the 
top. 
Having constructed a cross-ethnic ruling elite, based on a system of ethnic quotas, the top level agents 
set about a strategy, first of isolating the political and administrative classes from all regional demands. 
This was achieved thanks to the lower level agents’ dependence on rents distribution from the top. 
Secondly, the ruling elite attempted to complete the cross-ethnic strategy by undermining the holding 
power of ethnic institutions, and instead promoting a quasi-co-operative institutional system built on 
social classes rather than ethnic ties. However, as it turned out the implementation capabilities of the 
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ruling elite did not stretch that far. The holding power of the ethnic associations was too strong, and 
instead the ruling elite accepted to integrate the associations into the coalition. 
The only group that was able to resist the attacks from the regime completely and absorb the repressive 
measures of the ruling elite was the teachers. Ironically, this group owed their strong holding power to 
the high priority of education given by the ruling elite, who therefore funded the growing numbers of 
teachers. 
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5. The Ivorian ’Mirage’ – Crisis and Adjustment 1980-1994 
By the close of the 1970s, Côte d’Ivoire’s booming economic growth turned into a recession, and the 
Ivorian ‘miracle’ was substituted with what has since been labeled the Ivorian ‘mirage’. It started with a 
sharp decline in the international commodity prices of the export products that made up the core of the 
Ivorian economy: coffee and cocoa (Crook, 1990: 649), and it culminated in 1987, when the Ivorian 
government suspended the reimbursement of its foreign debt, and continued until the devaluation of 
the CFA Franc in 1994. (Akindès, 2000: 128-129). In the mid-1990s a temporary improvement of the 
economy appeared but, at this point the economic viability of the institutional setting underpinning the 
preexisting political settlement had already been eroded. 
The Ivorian government’s response to the falling prices on coffee and cocoa was twofold: First of all 
Houphouët-Boigny insisted that CAISTAB kept up the farm-gate prices paid to the smallholders. Thereby 
Houphouët-Boigny pursued the price regulating idea behind the CAISTAB system and upheld the mutual 
understanding between the ruling elite and the peasants, but the fact that most of the accumulated 
rents from the export crops had been spent on investments rather than been kept as savings meant that 
CAISTAB was quickly indebted and, by the end of the 1980s the CAISTAB was near bankruptcy (Woods, 
2004: 232). Secondly, the government, overestimating its influence as the world’s largest cocoa 
producing country, launched a ‘cocoa-war’. From 1987 to 1989 the Ivorian government locked up the 
country’s cocoa in warehouses and refused to sell until the world prices would go up (Losch, 2002: 211). 
But the ‘cocoa-war’ turned out to be a disaster to the Ivorian economy. Côte d’Ivoire was not able to 
push up the prices on the world market, and by excluding itself from the market for two years, it lost 
market shares to other cocoa producing countries. As a result of these policies, commercial borrowings 
and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) debt, by 1990 Côte d’Ivoire had the largest debt burden 
per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa (Crook, 1990: 649). 
The other factor stems from the nature of the post-colonial government’s agricultural policy, largely 
encouraging increasing agricultural outputs by deforestation of land, and putting the land into use 
without stimulating smallholder incentives to invest in new production intensifying technologies. By the 
1980s there was not much land left to clear (Crook 2001) and, at the same time, the old cocoa plants 
had been exhausted and the planting of a new generation was needed. However, the costs of replanting 
were high (Woods, 2004: 226), and so the cocoa boom was reaching its structural limits (Woods, 2004: 
236), thereby further adding to the crisis.  
5.1. Impact on elites 
The emerging economic crisis of the 1980s had an impact on the power distribution, both horizontally 
on an intra-elite level, and vertically between higher and lower level agents within the ruling coalition. 
Three major threats towards the integrity and holding power of the ruling coalition can be identified: 1) 
the rising power of multinational companies in the cocoa industry, threatening the ruling elite’s 
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integrity, 2) the reforms of the SAP, threatening the ruling elite’s control of the internal market rents 
and their rent-seeking capabilities, and 3) the falling commodity prices on coffee and cocoa, dramatically 
reducing the holding power of the ruling elites as opposed to the holding power of lower level agents. 
These three interdependent threats all led to intra-elite struggles over rents along diverse parameters. It 
is the impact of those threats that will be explored in this chapter. 
5.1.1. The Rising Power of Multinational Companies in the Cocoa Sector 
Taking into consideration the importance for Côte d’Ivoire of the export earnings on cocoa and coffee, 
the falling world prices of those crops at the beginning of the 1980s posed a fundamental threat to the 
core of the political settlement and ruling coalition’s ability to hold on to power. It is clear that the 
motive behind Houphouët-Boigny’s waging of the cocoa-war against the international buyers was not 
just to protect the smallholding cocoa farmers, but rather to protect the interests of the ruling elite. In 
this perspective, one could argue that the war was a test of the ruling elite’s holding power against 
external market pressures from multinational cocoa companies. However, the outcome of the cocoa-
war clearly revealed that Houphouët-Boigny was severely overestimating the elite’s capabilities of 
resisting those forces. The cocoa-war was launched by Houphouët-Boigny in July 1987 when Côte 
d’Ivoire locked up its warehouses and blocked the shipments of cocoa in an attempt to force up the 
commodity prices. The war went on for 27 months until Houphouët-Boigny finally gave up in October 
1989. The ‘war’ had been a complete failure as the market was able to wait until the cocoa beans were 
released (Losch, 2002: 211), and to save his reputation Houphouët-Boigny was reportedly forced to 
make a secret deal with the French government who partly subsidized the loss as Houphouët-Boigny 
sold the Ivorian stocks at a reduced price to the French company Sucres et Denrées (Crook, 1990: 659). 
At this point, the Ivorian cocoa sector had been severely damaged and was in dire needs of liquidity due 
to the lack of income in the foregone 27 Months. The total defeat in the cocoa-war was a result of one 
side of what Losch has labeled the double downgrading16 of the power of Côte d’Ivoire in the global 
economy. The emerging power of multinational companies had fundamentally changed the power 
distribution, so that the value chain was becoming increasingly buyer driven, thereby reducing the 
power of the cocoa producing countries. Consequently, as revealed by the cocoa-war, even Côte 
d’Ivoire, the producer of 20 to 30 per cent of the world production of cocoa, was rendered unable to 
influence the market prices. Instead, due to the cocoa-war, Côte d’Ivoire lost market shares to upcoming 
producer countries such as Brazil and Malaysia (McGovern, 2011: 145)(Losch, 2002: 212). The dominant 
position of the multinational companies in the cocoa value chain would soon have a severe impact of on 
the domestic cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire17. 
                                                          
16
 The other part having to do with the geopolitical situation which will be dealt with in the next section. 
17
 In Côte d’Ivoire, the coffee production was based on low quality beans resulting in lower output, and therefore, 
compared to cocoa, coffee production was of less importance to the Ivorian economy (McGovern, 2011: 138). 
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The falling cocoa and coffee prices and the lost earnings during the cocoa-war had, as a consequence, 
weakened the capability of the CAISTAB to fulfill its role as the primary investor in the Ivorian society. 
For the Ivorian companies this meant that they had to look elsewhere for financing (Losch, 2003: 51). 
Simultaneously in the cocoa sector, the need for liquidity had become urgent after the cocoa-war. With 
the weakened position of the CAISTAB and a weak Ivorian financial sector that the government had 
neglected to develop, the domestic companies had to look for foreign investors (Losch, 2002: 215). 
Eventually, this lead to the integration of the domestic companies into the structures of multinational 
companies (Losch, 2002: 216). In this regard, the forces of the global market and the international 
donors’ pressure for the government to open up and privatize the Ivorian market joined forces and 
resulted in the most important sector of the Ivorian economy, and the cornerstone in the power-
reproducing system to come under foreign control (Losch, 2000: 7). 
The ruling elite’s incapability of resisting the institutional changes resulting from the multinational cocoa 
companies’ growing control of the Ivorian cocoa sector forced the state and the political class to 
reposition themselves towards the new private sector, ultimately bringing Ivorian politics under the 
influence of the big companies (Losch, 2003: 52). The entrance of big companies into the political scene 
profoundly reinforced the crystallization of the ruling elite along different factions. Although the ruling 
elite was represented in the companies, the representatives of the ruling elite was now chosen by 
private operators. Obviously, such a constellation made it hard for the top levels of the ruling elite to 
control the distribution of rents among themselves (Losch, 2003: 54). In consequence, the integrity of 
the ruling coalition became less coherent as differing elite affiliations with different companies, opened 
up the possibility of individual elites to built separate powerbases, potentially with differing interests. 
For instance, Henry Konan Bédié18 acquired a prominent position as shareholder within SIFCOM19. The 
link between SIFCOM and Bédié was used by SIFCOM to acquire a leading position within the Ivorian 
cocoa sector, and by the 1995 elections SIFCOM reciprocated and sponsored Bédié’s electoral 
campaign20(Losch, 2003: 52). Likewise, the privatizations carried out by Ouattara in the early 1990s to a 
large extent benefitted primarily foreign companies. This led to popular resentment towards foreign 
companies, especially the French, and enemies of Ouattara have speculated in the connections between 
                                                          
18
 President of the National Assembly (Toungara, 1995:34). 
19
 SIFCOM is the holding company behind SIFCA, which was originally a French cocoa company but slowly taken 
over by Ivorian shareholders, coming under entirely Ivorian control in 1992. The company invested the 1990s in 
the production of liquid cocoa butter in France and in cocoa pounder in Spain (Losch, 2003:52). 
20
 For the companies, such alliance also had a down side. When Bédié was removed from power in 1999 it had a 
damaging effect on SIFCOM that lost the privileged position in the cocoa sector. 
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Ouattara and certain French companies, such as Bouyges21, implying that Ouattara is supported by 
foreign companies22(Losch, 2003: 53). 
5.1.2. Impact of the SAP 
To fight the economic imbalances that started to appear on the close of the 1970s, the Ivorian 
government had no choice, but to adopt the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) strongly 
recommended by the donor community, especially so by the Bretton Woods institutions of the World 
Bank and the IMF (Akindès, 2000: 129)(Losch, 2000: 3). This coincided with the geopolitical part of what 
Losch – as mentioned before – labeled the double downgrading of the political power in Côte d’Ivoire, 
reflecting the fact that the end of the cold war had fundamentally changed the Western countries, 
particularly France’s political interest in the country (Losch, 2003: 50). Now, the badly needed donor aid 
was conditional on the liberal reforms within the framework of structural adjustment, and the Ivorian 
government, throughout the 1980s committed itself to a series of reform programmes, negotiated with 
the World Bank and IMF (Akindès, 2001: 3-4). As with the rising power of the multinational companies, 
the SAP posed a major threat to the survival of the institutions that secured the reproduction of power 
within the existing political settlement, so in order to uphold the redistributive system that maintained 
the clientelism in spite of the SAP (Campbell, 2008: 94), the elite fought to resist institutional changes on 
two important fronts: that of the CAISTAB and that of the public enterprises. 
As in accordance with the SAP the dismantling of the CAISTAB and the liberalization took place in three 
stages: first, the system of administered prices and buying was abolished. This was followed by the 
removal of the control of costs of transport, the distribution of bags23 and the prerogatives on exports, 
such as limiting the direct sales made by the CAISTAB to 15 per cent of the total volume harvested in 
199724, and finally the board of CAISTAB was opened to exporters and producers (Losch, 2002: 214). The 
slowness of this process is evidence of the unwillingness of the ruling elite to give up its control of the 
system. As will be shown in the next chapter, the government fully dismantled the CAISTAB in 1999, but 
only to replace it with new regulatory institutions. 
Although Losch and others argue that the ruling elite suffered a great loss of power due to the SAP 
reforms, the struggle for control of the public sector shows that one should be careful not to 
underestimate the elite’s ability to resist the institutional changes imposed on it by the international 
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 Bouyges is a French industrial group and a main shareholder in strategically important Ivorian public enterprises 
such as Compagnie Ivoirienne d’electricité (electricity production), and Société des eaux de la Côte d’Ivoire (Water 
supply) (Kouadio, 2009: 91). 
22
 Such rumours have reemerged after Ouattara took over the presidency with the support of French and American 
forces in 2011. See for instance http://www.eburnienews.net/index.php/2012/03/gaz-le-nouveau-cadeau-de-
ouattara-a-bouygues/ or http://lesouffledivin.fr/2011/04/06/gbagbo-lamine-par-la-conspiration-bouygues-
bollore-sarkozy-ouattara/ 
23
 Until then, the CAISTAB had ensured the supply of all bags needed for the collection and transportation of 
beans, amounting to no less than 30 million 60 kilos jute sacks. 
24
 As mention earlier, the sales and export of cocoa had been left to private agents, however from the end of the 
1970s the CAISTAB went into “direct sales”, negotiating contracts itself and demanding that private exporters 
implement them. By the end of 1980s this practice covered up to 80 per cent of the harvest. 
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donors.  As Contamin writes, the first series of reforms of 1981 to privatize the public sector has often 
been described as evidence of the state’s disengagement in the sector, while in fact, the state through 
these reforms strengthened its control (Contamin, 1997: 96). Despite the objectives of the SAP and the 
demands of the donor community, the elite successfully managed to bring the public enterprises under 
even tighter forms of legal and bureaucratic control than before, rather than exposing them to the 
disciplines of the market (Crook, 1989: 225). This was achieved by a restructuring, integrating them fully 
into the government bureaucracy and under strict public service regulation, now calling the public 
enterprises etablissements public nationaux (EPN) (Crook, 1989: 210). In this way, and through an 
intransparent privatization of the the public sector the ruling elite was able to turn the donors’ demands 
of reforms to their own advantage (Campbell, 2008: 94) (Losch, 2000: 6). Indeed, according to Campbell, 
not only did the ruling elite to a large degree manage to keep public companies under their control, the 
reforms also conveniently coincided with the need to reduce the scope of state patronage and a political 
agenda aimed at redistributing the opportunities which remained whilst renewing presidential power 
(Campbell, 2008: 94). Houphouët-Boigny and other members of the older generations within the ruling 
elite looked with suspicion on younger elites who were establishing their own private clientelist 
networks from their positions within the public enterprises. The privatizations gave Houphouët-Boigny 
an opportunity to reduce the powerbase of those elites. This theme will be further elaborated in the 
next chapter. 
However, while the ruling elite proved able to turn the institutional changes in the public sector into its 
own advantage, the strong resistance to the privatization efforts, created an intra-elite conflict. At first, 
the nature of this conflict was primarily generational, but slowly turned into what seems to be a largely 
ideological one. The older patrons at the center of power within the party showed reluctance to recede 
power on to their younger ambitious clients. Nevertheless, if clients stayed loyal to their benefactor, 
they could expect to rise to higher, more influential and more lucrative positions within the party, in the 
bureaucracy or in the public enterprises. But when the crisis increased in the 1980s, the pressure from 
the group of youngsters intensified as the access to rents decreased. While the old guard of party 
militants still had their background in the agricultural sector, already ten years after independence the 
income of elites lay increasingly in urban activities (Widner, 1992: 50). For a larger part, the income of 
the elite was now drawn from government service, commerce or manufacturing, and many elites had 
lucrative positions in the public sector companies or private firms that produced agricultural products 
(Widner, 1992: 51). As explained in the foregoing chapter, parallel to this trend away from planter 
background, the newer generations of the elite had become increasingly technocratic, due to the policy 
of Houphouët-Boigny, since the faux complot of 1963 of only allowing new elites to enter the public 
enterprises, not the party agencies (Crook, 1989: 215). In order to protect his powerbase, and eliminate 
others’, Houphouët-Boigny passed over this new generation of technocrats when making new 
appointments to attractive positions, thereby further adding to the tensions, leading some of the 
41 
 
belittled to defect to the opposition (Toungara, 1995: 24). Indeed, it was members of this generation 
that would come to constitute the core leadership of the opposition parties in the 1990 elections 
(Toungara, 1995: 22). 
For those of the technocrats who stayed within the PDCI the conflict took an ideological turn. From 
1990, under the leadership of the newly appointed prime minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a 
technocrat with an international career behind him,25 the government changed its attitude towards the 
SAP demands for privatization and a more effective management of the state and the public enterprises 
(Contamin, 1997: 100). The change presented talented technocrats with new opportunities as the old 
policy of recruitment based on loyalty to the PDCI was replaced with a recruitment policy of hiring those 
best suited for the job. Hence, the new generation of technocrats came with a mentality of 
“managerialism” that indicated that for the first time in Ivoiran post-colonial history the prestige of 
holding office out-distanced the attraction of personal gain (Toungara, 1995: 25).  
While this change can be seen as the political break-through, and the rehabilitation of the generation 
that had been excluded from positions in the party top after the faux plot of 1963 (Toungara, 1995: 25), 
it also intensified the conflict between the mentality of the old “traders” and the young “managers”, 
now generational as well as ideological (Contamin, 1997: 100). As will be explained further in the next 
chapter the conflict would affect the power struggle over the succession issue. 
5.2. Lower Level Pressures 
In the rural areas of the cocoa and coffee belt the impact of the economic crisis was felt in three 
different ways. First of all, the crisis coincided with a structural crisis in the cocoa and coffee production: 
Secondly, the government’s initiation of a programme for the return of the young to the countryside 
further increased the pressures created by the structural crisis, and thirdly, the smallholders were 
severely hit by the drop in the world commodity prices on cocoa and coffee.  
The ethnic tensions in the countryside had their roots in the very nature of the PDCI’s agricultural 
policies. As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, the ‘mise en valuer’ policies of the PDCI government 
had encouraged a continuous expansion of the cocoa and coffee production into new unoccupied 
forestland, thereby securing an ever increasing output to sell on the export market. The system of this 
pioneer cultivation combined with price regulation of the produce by CAISTAB had favored extensive 
production at the expense of investment into intensifying technology. But, by the 1980s the pioneer 
culture had reached its structural limits, as unoccupied forestland to take into use became rarer. 
Simultaneously, many of the cocoa and coffee plants were aging which again presented the producers 
with more challenges: first of all, older plants produce less crops- and of a poorer quality - than new 
ones, and secondly, replanting is a time consuming and expensive undertaking (Woods, 2003:643). As 
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 For more on Ouattara’s background and entrance into Ivorian politics, see the next chapter. 
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earlier mentioned, diversification efforts into other crops, such as pineapple, bananas and rubber had 
already been introduced in the areas with the oldest plants, but they demanded more labour. As a 
result, land rights became an increasingly contested issue, and at the same time wage-labour became 
more costly (Woods, 2003: 643). 
The financial problems of the state combined with the privatization strategies of the SAP, meant that for 
the first time in the post-colonial era, the bureaucracy, the vast employment opportunities in the public 
enterprises and PDCI party agencies were not able to absorb the outflow of university graduates. So, in 
an attempt to solve the problem of the growing number of young students with no available jobs upon 
graduation, the government initiated a programme for the return of the young to the countryside, with 
the goal of reintegrating the young into their rural hometowns (Crook, 1990: 658) (Akindès, 2000: 135). 
However, as have been mentioned before, the indigenous populations of the rural areas, who belonged 
to the segment that had invested most profoundly in education for their sons, had been selling off their 
land in the years of the cocoa and coffee boom. Consequently, the returning children, disillusioned from 
their expectations of a professional career in the city, found that their fathers had sold their lands. The 
policy of returning the young to the land added to the traditional generational conflicts in the 
countryside, as the returning sons felt that the fathers had mismanaged the family fortune. Not 
surprisingly, the policy also further aggravated the conflicts over land, as the fathers of those students, 
had receded much of their land to migrants, and now had very little land to offer their own sons, or to 
feed them from. But the policy also invoked resentment towards the outsiders26, who had taken over 
their land (Crook, 2001: 40-41). Therefore, the returning students consequently opposed the outsiders’ 
right to the land (Woods, 2003: 651). As a result attempts were made to retake the land from the 
outsiders, and new norms were invented to fight the increasing institutional power of the outsiders 
(Woods, 2003: 643)(Crook, 2001: 40-41). Such measures were possible since the ownership issue was 
often blurred by the lack of regulation of the land tenure system and the absence of legally binding 
documents. There are reports that in some cases land that had been sold by oral agreement was 
retaken by the former landowner (Kouadio, 2009: 80). 
Although the world commodity prices on coffee and cocoa started falling from the late 1970s and 
onwards, thanks to the price regulation of CAISTAB the peasants did not feel the effect instantly. In fact, 
due to Houphouët-Boigny’s stubborn refusal to cut the farm-gate prices, the peasants kept receiving the 
same prices until Houphouët-Boigny finally had to give in and reduce the prices for the first time in 
1989. However, at that time, the peasants were already starting to feel the impact of the falling world 
prices. After years of running a deficit, and with the lack of income during the cocoa war, the CAISTAB 
was running out of money. The system could do little to protect the farmers against the consequences 
of CAISTAB’s insolvency, as it created a liquidity crisis in the banks and among cocoa traders, which 
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 Outsider here refers to the people who came as immigrants from abroad or from other regions of the country, 
and thus were not considered indigenous in the cocoa belt. 
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eventually meant that the traders in lack of funds either did not pick up the crop at all, or they tried to 
buy at reduced, illegal prices (Crook, 1990: 659-660). But the biggest blow to the cocoa and coffee 
producing peasants came in 1989 when the prices were cut by 50 per cent. Of course, such drastic loss 
of income could not avoid applying further pressure on the social tensions already present in the rural 
societies. But for Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI and the ruling coalition as a whole, the most immediate 
threat to their ability to control the country, may not have been the growing social tensions, however 
serious they were, but the threat posed by the breach of confidence in the publics’ belief that the ruling 
elites were able to manage the cocoa and coffee rents in a way that benefitted all to a satisfying extent. 
5.3. Institutional responses 
Houphouët-Boigny responded to the emerging socio-political tensions and the people’s eroding 
confidence in the political class already in 1980 by a series of reforms of the political system, or in 
Crooks terms “an Ivorian equivalent to Mao’s Cultural Revolution” (Crook, 1995: 13-14). Those reforms 
included a decentralization of power to the local level, starting with the creation of 135 elected 
communes (Crook, 1995: 14). The reform also paved the way for competitive elections between PDCI 
party candidates for the national assembly. There are several explanations why Houphouët-Boigny 
chose to carry through these reforms. As Widner argues, Houphouët-Boigny had a policy of bringing in 
new members in the party elite every 6th year, and faced with a growing economic crisis and escalating 
distrust in the political class, the introduction of competitive elections among the PDCI candidates 
presented a chance to renew the political elite as well as making the appearance of being open to 
democratic ideas at a time when the international donor community increasingly pressured for political 
reform (Widner, 1994a: 153). Furthermore, as Bakary suggests, competitive elections were an effective 
way of managing the overproduction of aspirants for political offices (Bakary, 1984: 49). A further 
incentive for the electoral reform as well as the decentralization was the lack of public finances. By 
moving the economic responsibility of some services from the central government to the local 
administrations, Houphouët-Boigny hoped that the local administration would find new ways of raising 
funds, while easing the economic pressure on the state. Likewise, Houphouët-Boigny encouraged the 
elected candidates to privately fund developmental projects in their constituting areas, on the same 
model that he himself had been funding huge developmental and construction projects in his own 
hometown, Yamoussoukro27(Fauré, 1993: 316).  
From the point of view of the ruling elite within the PDCI, including Houphouët-Boigny himself, the 
reforms did however also have two negative side effects. First of all, the elections resulted in tensions 
within the PDCI, but initially, if the goal was a renewal of the ruling elite, the competitive elections 
looked like a success. More than 600 candidates competed for only 147 seats. Only 27 outgoing 
deputies successfully defended their seats and consequently 82 per cent of the members of the new 
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 Houphouët-Boigny made his own hometown, Yamoussoukro, the country’s capital and built a basillica ”just a 
little bit bigger” than Sct. Peter’s Basillica in the Vatican (McGovern, 2011: 152). 
44 
 
assembly of 1980 were new to the job (Fauré, 1993: 316). However, since the competition took place 
within the framework of the PDCI, the campaigning did not take root in any substantial political debate, 
but instead the campaigns tended to become dirty and personal with high personal costs as the result. 
Naturally, such campaigns led to internal tensions within the PDCI. Secondly, running a campaign was an 
expensive task, but with the declining economy, a parliamentary career was no longer a ticket to 
profitable public accounts in the same way as it used to be. From a cost-benefit analysis perspective, 
engaging in a competitive election became less attractive during the years of economic crisis. In the 
elections of 1985 the effect was seen in the much lower numbers of candidates (Fauré, 1993:316). 
Therefore, in 1985 61 out of 116 deputees managed to defend their seats and the replacement ratio 
declined to 61 per cent (Fauré, 1993: 317). 
The introduction of competitive elections and the closer link between the parliament member and his 
constituency that goes with it also presented the deputee with a new base to build up his political 
power from. Although power was still concentrated in the party agencies outside the national assembly, 
the new system did increase the personalized links between local constituencies and the ruling elite in 
Abidjan. As explained in the foregoing chapter, this connection had not been built on ethnic and tribal 
affiliations, but with the new electoral system, constituency building became increasingly built on ethnic 
ties. In this regard, the local home-town associations came to play an important role and strengthened 
the young elites’ perception of the home-town association as an important means to build up a 
powerbase (Woods, 1994: 174). Indeed, numerous new associations were founded by young men with 
the purpose of establishing a constituency and an access point to enter into the elite (Woods, 1994: 
170). 
Contrary to the expansion in the number of hometown associations established by individuals and based 
on ethnic ties, in the same period the number of rural cooperatives declined. The decline in rural 
cooperatives bear witness to the ruling elite’s declining implementation capabilities at the lower levels 
in the countryside. As Woods explains, membership of the cooperatives was voluntary, and as the state 
– due to the privatizations of the public enterprises – retreated from the rural areas, the incentive of 
being a member declined simply because these institutions were not thoroughly rooted in the local 
culture (Woods, 1999: 501). The lack of popular interest in the cooperatives was partly due to their close 
affiliation with the former public enterprises and the tendency of these agencies to treat the peasants as 
wage labourers. However, the lack of interest also revealed the simmering ethnic tensions within the 
rural societies, as these tensions supplanted themselves into power struggles based on generational and 
ethnic tensions within the cooperatives, excluding weaker ethnic groups from influence (Woods, 1999: 
500). 
Ironically, even though the decline in elite power holding in the countryside was partly based on the 
peasants’ defection from the cooperatives, this did not improve the holding power of the peasants, as 
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they remained unorganized. Instead, due to the liberalization the state had to retreat and give up its 
dominance of the countryside.  At the same time the multinational companies were now able to use 
their dominant position to push down the prices (Losch, 2002: 223), thereby further squeezing the 
smallholder. In this way, the combination of the liberalization of the agro-industry and the broken price 
security for the peasants recomposed the economy and institutions radically under the control of 
foreign multinational companies (Campbell, 2008: 96), capturing an increasing share of the cocoa rents 
from the peasants as well as from the ruling elite. 
5.4. Preconditions of Multiparty Democracy 
In the last decade before the introduction of multiparty democracy, the ruling coalition was struggling 
with a loss of cohesiveness. With a decentralization of the access to rents from the most important 
export sector, the cocoa sector, due to the combined pressures of the rising power of multinational 
companies, and the SAP reform programmes, Houphouët-Boigny and the top level elites of the PDCI 
were losing their ability to manage the rent-seeking behavior of the agents within the ruling coalition. 
The need to lessen the financial burden of the state further led Houphouët-Boigny to introduce political 
reforms that reinforced the ruling elite’s weakened position in the countryside along with the state’s 
retreat from the agricultural sector. Instead, traditional institutions composed along ethnic ties, such as 
the hometown association were gaining power.  Therefore, at the time of the introduction of multiparty 
democracy, the ruling elite was facing the challenge of keeping together a coalition that was breaking 
apart vertically as well as horizontally, allowing the excluded elite more room for maneuvering and 
opening up for the possibility of mobilization along ethnic lines. 
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6. Political Liberalisation 1990-2002 
This chapter will investigate the events in the first decade of multiparty elections in post-colonial Côte 
d’Ivoire, and how the elites adjusted their rent-seeking patterns to the new conditions of the multiparty 
democracy. The chapter is divided into three main parts: the first part focuses on the period 1990-1993 
from the introduction of multiparty elections to the death of Houphouët-Boigny. The second part 
focuses on Bédié’s attempts at reconstructing the PDCI ruling elite in the time period 1993-1999, and 
finally the last part concentrates on the failing attempts at constructing a viable political settlement in 
the post-PDCI era beginning with the coup d’état in 1999.  
6.1. Impact on Political Institutions 
In chapter 5 it was described how the economic crisis during the 1980s led to a breach of trust between 
the ruling elite and the people. The situation had also nourished a rising critique of the government 
policies. As a result of the economic crisis and the adjustment programmes carried out by the 
government under pressure from the international donors, joblessness and frustrations rose and so too 
did the pressure from the opposition and trade unions and student groups to reform and democratize 
the country (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 16). In 1989, the financial situation was so severe that the 
government was forced to slash the prices for coffee and cocoa by half (Widner, 1994a: 159). 
Government intentions of introducing more austerity measures further aggravated the situation and in 
1989 and 1990 leaders of the SYNARES and SYNESCI took the lead in calling for a suspension of the 
austerity measures along with demands of autonomy of all associations and the introduction of 
multiparty elections (Woods, 1996: 126). Furthermore, Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte 
d’Ivoire (FESCI), a student organization founded in the spring of 1990, together with trade unions and 
leftist political parties mobilized people to rally in the streets against the PDCI (Human Rights Watch, 
2008: 22). In front of these opposition groups was Laurent Gbagbo, president of the leading opposition 
party Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), and closely connected to SYNARES, due to his background as a 
university professor (Crook, 1995: 16). 
Confronted for the first time with a popular uprising that was on the verge of going out of control 
Houphouët-Boigny responded in two ways: firstly, by the end of March 1990 he handed over the 
responsibility for the economic policy to a politically unknown economist Allasane Dramane Ouattara, 
president of the IMF’s Africa division. Secondly, Houphouët-Boigny, to the surprise of most people 
announced that multiparty elections would be held within two months, and that as a consequence, 
opposition parties would be legalized (Fauré, 1993: 317). However, the elections were easily won by the 
PDCI, partly due to the poor organization of the new opposition who had a very short time to organize 
themselves and their campaigns, and partly due to the fact that the regime kept the election under tight 
control. The opposition’s demand of a transitional government was rejected and so was its demand for 
an electoral committee to oversee the elections. The PDCI was responsible for the drawing up of the 
electoral register, delivering voting cards and emptying the ballot boxes. Also, the PDCI kept a firm grip 
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on the radio, television and the press (Fauré, 1993: 321). Cases of blackmail and intimidation of 
members of the opposition were also reported as well (Fauré, 1993: 321). 
With the rising discontent and, the increasing numbers of lower level agents, such as labour unions and 
student groups breaking away from the ruling coalition to participate in street demonstrations it 
became clear that the political organization of the country was no longer able to regulate and manage 
the challenges posed to the political settlement. But, by introducing multipartism to the institutional 
framework of Ivorian politics, Houphouët-Boigny had shrewdly diverted the public attention away from 
the general anger against the regime, and out-maneuvered the opposition in the elections. However, 
the introduction of Ouattara into Ivorian politics as well as the introduction of multiparty elections had 
some severe side-effects on the integrity of the PDCI itself, as will be shown below. In the following 
years until his death, Houphouët-Boigny’s main challenge would be to maintain the balance between 
external demands and intra-elite pressures. 
6.2. Impact on Elites 
Judging from the results of the elections of 1990, Houphouët-Boigny was extremely successful in his 
handling of the external pressures. The PDCI won a sweeping victory in the legislative elections of 1990, 
winning 163 out of 175 seats, nine seats going for the FPI while the rest going to Parti ivoirien des 
travailleurs (PIT) and two independent candidates. In the municipal elections the PDCI won in 123 
communes, the FPI in 6, while 3 were won by independents. In the presidential elections with Gbagbo as 
his main opponent Houphouët-Boigny won the presidential election by 81.7 per cent of the votes in his 
favour, with a turn-out of 69.16 per cent (Fauré, 1993: 318-320). 
The victory had been secured by the very short notice that made it impossible for the new opposition 
parties to organize an effective mobilizing machinery, but the results of the elections were also due to 
an effective reshuffling of the PDCI leadership, carried out by Houphouët-Boigny. With the introduction 
of multiparty elections the PDCI was, for the first time in post-colonial history, forced to find a strategy 
that would strengthen its appeal to the voters, to avoid people voting for the opposition, and it seems 
that to Houphouët-Boigny it was clear that the party needed a renewal in order to avoid being looked 
upon as “the old regime”. While Houphouët-Boigny himself still held some credibility among vast groups 
of the voters, most of his ministers and the old guard of the party were being blamed for the 
mismanagement of the country’s economy and held responsible for the financial misfortunes by the 
public (Fauré, 1991: 33). 
The first step in that maneuver was taken when Houphouët-Boigny introduced Ouattara in April 1990 to 
lead the Comité interministeriel de coordination du programme de stabilisation et de relance 
economique to oversee the adjustment programme, and then by  November 7 the same year, he was 
named prime minister (Kouadio, 2009: 89). There are several theories why Houphouët-Boigny chose to 
appoint Ouattara, all of which may possess a fragment of truth. First of all, Ouattara was an outsider 
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with no political background or constituency. Since his youth, Ouattara had been studying abroad before 
entering an international technocratic career within the institutions of IMF and the Banque central des 
états de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. As such, Ouattara posed no threat to Houphouët-Boigny’s political control. 
By introducing an outsider with no powerbase of his own, the appointment of Ouattara could have been 
to avoid the Bourgieba syndrome28. Secondly, coming from outside the PDCI ranks, Ouattara could bring 
fresh input to the party while at the same time, be a reassurance to the international community which 
was at this point extremely concerned with the regime’s ability and willingness to carry through the SAP 
reforms (Konaté, 2002: 278)(Crook, 1995: 16-17). In this sense, Ouattara was considered to be a 
politically un-dangerous reformer, a whiff of fresh air to mediate between Houphouët-Boigny and the 
angered public at this time of declining political trust in the government (Konaté, 2002: 283). 
The next step in the renewal of the PDCI was taken at the party congress on 1st to 5th of October 1990, 
before the elections (Fauré, 1991: 39). For the powerful 400 members political bureau, Houphouët-
Boigny appointed 300 youths, and only 100 elders (Toungara, 1995: 30). Naturally such a renewal 
caused a lot of generational tension within the party and, despite attempts by Houphouët-Boigny to 
reconcile the generational factions, the tensions continued and it was within this struggle between 
factions of the party, that Ouattara came to play a dramatic role (Toungara, 1995: 31). 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the factions within the PDCI were aligned along not just generational 
divides, but just as much along a struggle for access to the rents controlled by the party and the state. It 
is clear that the renewal of the party leadership constituted a major attack on the older generation’s 
control of these rents, and for these disgruntled old guards, Bédié became the natural leader. With 
Ouattara’s accession to power in 1990 and his ruthless reforms that attacked the rent-seeking 
opportunities within the core institutions of the patronage system an alliance between the older 
generation and a faction of the younger took form. The younger faction based in the bureaucracy also 
felt disgruntled by the policies of the SAP that induced a loss of power on them and threatened the old 
distributive patterns (Crook, 1990: 664-665). Therefore, this faction within the younger generation 
found a natural ally in Bédié and the older generation with whom they found a common cause in 
protecting their access to rents. Ouattara, on his side, became the natural leader of a generation of 
technocrats, who would expect to benefit from a fitter public service (Crook, 1997: 224). 
The intra-PDCI struggles further strengthened the holding power of the excluded elite, especially the FPI 
despite their disastrous elections. In the early days of the crisis of 1990 lower level agents of the ruling 
coalition had already been deserting to the benefit of the FPI. Back then during the strikes from 
February to April, new syndicates were founded independently as breakaway sections of the official 
associations under the wing of the quasi-corporatist framework of PDCI including everything from bus 
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 The Bourgieba syndrome refers to the Tunisian president Habib Bourgieba, who was overthrown in a coup d’état 
by his close political ally and prime minister, Ben Ali, on the claim that Bourgieba due to old age and a weakening 
health was unfit to govern. 
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drivers, government healthcare workers and even government press and computer programmers 
(Widner,1994: 160). But now the intra-elite conflicts opened new opportunities for the FPI elite to 
engage in the fight for power. As a result of the cracks within the PDCI several attempts were made by 
leading PDCI members to establish a new settlement with room for the FPI leadership. 
This opportunity presented itself as the rivalry of the two factions became increasingly personalized in 
the two persons of Bédié and Ouattara, especially as Houphouët-Boigny’s health grew worse, and the 
rivalry turned into a succession struggle. In 1992 an anti-Ouattara campaign was sparked from within 
the PDCI after Ouattara answered “we shall see” 29 when asked whether he would be a candidate for the 
presidency in a television broadcast (le Pape, 2002: 17). Attempts were made to mediate as Philippe 
Yancé30 proposed a triumvirate between Bédié, Ouattara and opposition leader, Gbagbo, but to no avail 
(Konaté, 2002: 286-287). As another attempt to balance the power within the party, Houphouët-Boigny 
accepted the introduction of an article 11 into the constitution, an article that, in the case of the death 
of the president, would leave the presidency to Bédié for the rest of the electoral term (Crook, 1995: 
12). While essentially this article put Ouattara check mate in the succession struggle, Ouattara 
approached Gbagbo in order to buy himself some political leverage, however Gbagbo rejected him 
(Crook, 1997: 224). 
The increase in FPI’s holding power also expressed itself in the strategies pursued by the FPI leadership 
in order to gain influence. Since the popular uprisings led  by the teachers’ syndicates in early 1990, 
resulting in multiparty elections the same year, street demonstrations remained among the most used 
strategies by the FPI to pressure the regime well into 1992 (Crook, 1997: 222). This was also the case 
when, in 1991-1992 FPI supported violent protests organized by their lower level agents of the FESCI 
and the teachers. However, such measures were costly for the FPI, as the violence did not buy them 
much sympathy (McGovern, 2011: 113-114)(Crook, 1995: 39). On top of this, the Ouattara 
administration adopted a new law, which made the organizers of public demonstrations accountable for 
any violence that may come out of it. With this law in hand, Gbagbo, his son and other prominent 
figures of the FPI were arrested after new violent demonstrations on 18 February 1992, causing a hard 
blow to the FPI (Konaté, 2002: 288). After such treatment, it is not surprising that Gbagbo refused 
Ouattara’s approaches. But it does appear that either due to the increased costs for the FPI to involve in 
street demonstrations, or due to the new opportunities of influence that the intra-PDCI struggles 
presented to the FPI – or maybe rather due to a combination of both – the FPI changed its tactics and, 
by 1993 the FPI began to play what Crook refers to as “a more orthodox political game at the elite level” 
by attempting to benefit by the intra-PDCI struggles combined with attempts to improve the public 
awareness of the FPI (Crook, 1995: 39). 
                                                          
29
 My own translation of ”On verra”. 
30
 Philippe Yancé was the PDCI Secretary General (Toungara, 1995: 34). 
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When Houphouët-Boigny eventually died in 1993, Bédié worked fast and declared himself president on 
public television, and Ouattara quickly resigned from the post of prime minister, left the country and 
returned to a job in the IMF (Langer, 2003: 6). But, at this point the rivalry between Ouattara and Bédié 
and the factions behind them had acquired a character, not just of generational cleavages, but also of 
regional, religious and ethnic cleavages. As a Malinké, an ethnic group of the North (Langer, 2003: 5), 
Ouattara had become the focal point of the political interests of the northerners, and according to 
Coulibaly it was the dawning of a new political awareness of the northerners that pushed Ouattara to  
declare his candidacy on television in 1992 (Tiemoko, 1995: 146). In this way Ouattara became the 
symbol of the North-South divide (Dozon, 2000: 56). Within months of Houphouët-Boigny’s death the 
Northern wing of PDCI defected to form its own political party, Rassemblement des républicains de Côte 
d’Ivoire (RDR) (Boone, 2009: 191). Although RDR was originally founded by another defector of the PDCI, 
Kobina, in July 1994, Ouattara in August 1999 was invited and accepted to be the RDR candidate for the 
presidency in the 1995 elections (le Pape, 2002: 18). 
6.2.1. The Bédié regime 1993-1999: Recomposing the Settlement 
The establishment of the RDR was the consequence of the defection of a group of PDCI members with a 
tendency to have their constituencies in the northern, primarily Muslim regions of the country. In fact 
the founding of RDR constituted a fundamental political breakup, not only of the PDCI but of the ruling 
coalition as such. With the defectors’ breakaway and their establishment of RDR the political alliance 
built by Houphouët-Boigny in the 1970s between the Akan ethnic group of the South, and the Northern 
chiefs, the very backbone of the political settlement in the Ivoiran society during the last 20 years had 
been broken up. Thus, Bédié was faced with the challenge of building a new ruling coalition within 
multiparty democracy rule and capable of winning the elections coming up in 1995. But, with an 
opposition that brought together the votes of the North (the RDR), and the south west and south east 
(the FPI), the PDCI electoral majority was severely threatened (Crook, 1997: 225). 
Bédié was however supported by a general improvement in the economy. The death of Houphouët-
Boigny presented Bédié with an new chance: Houphouët-Boigny had stubbornly rejected the possibility 
of a devaluation of the CFA Franc, but in 1994, on French initiative the CFA Franc was devaluated by no 
less than 50 per cent (McGovern, 2011: 149)(Kouadio, 2009: 90). At the same time Bédié launched a 
new developmental strategy called Elephant d’Afrique (inspired by the “Asian tiger” economies) that 
showed remarkable results, creating an annual growth from 1994 to 1998 of 7 per cent.  As a 
consequence of the new growth of the economy the budget deficit was reduced from 11.9 per cent of 
GDP in 1993 to 6.5 per cent in 1994, and by 1998 it had fallen to only 1.8 per cent (Kouadio, 2009: 92)31.   
                                                          
31
 The economic growth in the first years of Bédié’s reign had two main causes: 1) The global commodity prices on 
cocoa started rising again, and 2) The devaluation of the CFA Franc encouraged foreign investments. As a result, 
1,272 new enterprises were created in 1996, against only 292 in 1993 (Akindès, 2001:4)(Kouadio, 2009: 92)(Losch, 
2002:213). 
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Incumbency and the control of the PDCI also gave Bédié organizational advantages. Some observers 
stress the eroding power of the state at the local level in the 1990s. The cooperatives dominated by 
members loyal to the PDCI were in decline and, the fact that a new generation of home-town 
association gave elites a power base on their own thereby made it harder for the top levels of the party 
to control them. Widner emphasizes the emerging new pluralism of associations created as mobilizing 
engines of the opposition parties, and that the political space was liberalized, causing an increasing 
number of people beginning to perceive of political authority as something to be achieved, not 
something ascriptive (Widner, 1994b: 192). It is evident that this gave political leaders who needed to 
establish new networks in the countryside an opportunity to do so by establishing new associations, 
demanding the resources of the CAISTAB to be turned over to them, and mobilizing support for their 
respective parties (Widner, 1994b: 201-202)(Woods, 1999: 503). 
Whereas these developments may have served to strengthen the otherwise extremely weak 
organizational base of the opposition, the increase in the relative organizational capabilities of the 
opposition at the local level as compared to those of PDCI should not be exaggerated. On the local level 
Bédié still had an advantage compared to the opposition. The PDCI was still in control of the cocoa and 
coffee rents which underpinned the strong patronage system than was used to mobilize voters. Despite 
the pluralism of local associations, the PDCI was still far better organized within the local areas, and they 
had the advantage of better access to infrastructure and media (MacLean, 2004: 607). It is also evident 
from field work carried out by MacLean that, in spite of the above mentioned development, the local 
party organization was generally weak with minimal local capacities, and therefore, individuals and 
groups frequently proceeded directly to their personal contacts in higher positions in the political 
system (MacLean, 2004: 608). As a result participation in these organization were limited, rendering the 
lower level political organizations delegitimized and incapable of delivering results on the same scale as 
personal patron-client connections facilitated. 
Consequently, in 1995 the strength of the ruling party was once again demonstrated in the elections. 
The two big opposition parties, the FPI and the RDR both decided to boycott the presidential election 
because of the introduction of a new electoral code that excluded Ouattara32 from running, on the claim 
that Ouattara was not an Ivorian citizen33. Not surprisingly Bédié won with 95 per cent of the votes 
(Langer, 2003: 6). The turn-out rate was 56 per cent (Crook, 1997: 235). The opposition decided to 
                                                          
32 Bédié’s government introduced an electoral code, which meant that to qualify for the presidency, one should be 
born in Côte d’Ivoire, and one’s parents should both be so too (Crook, 1997:228).  
33
 The arguments concerning Ouattara’s nationality rested on several issues: Ouattara claimed to descend from a 
royal family based in Burkina Faso, yet his parents were according to him both born in Côte d’Ivoire. However, 
proving that his parents were born in Côte d’Ivoire proved difficult. Especially the origin of his mother has been 
debated. It is even being claimed that the woman who he claims to be his mother, is not his biological, but an 
adoptive mother. Another issue is rooted in the fact that Ouattara, before becoming prime minister was working 
for the IFM and Banque central des etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest under a passport of Burkina Faso. In Ouattara’s 
defense, it was a diplomatic passport and as such it was not an identity paper (Konaté, 2002: 255). 
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contest the legislative elections, but not with much success. The PDCI won 147 seats, while leaving 10 
seats for the FPI and 14 for the RDR. In the local elections, the opposition won 33 communes all 
together, as measured against the 102 wins by the PDCI (Crook, 1997: 238-239). 
There are indications that Bédié initially pursued a strategy of reintroducing the ethnic quota policy of 
Houphouët-Boigny. This is demonstrated in Bédié’s actions upon his accession as he was able to 
reintegrate a prominent party defector, Bernard Zaorou, back into the ruling coalition by appointing him 
as minister of Culture, as well as appointing three prominent northerners to the new government: The 
Secretary General of the PDCI, Laurent Fologo, Lanciné Coulibaly and Lamine Fadika, former minister of 
the navy. (Crook, 1995: 40). However, the tendency of the reintroduction of the ethnic quota policy is 
refuted by Langers survey on ethnic participation in the top decision-making bodies of the party, as it –
on the contrary - shows that the representation of the Baoulé increased sharply upon Bédié’s accession 
to power, while the main victim of the change in leadership was Ouattara’s ethnic group, the Mandé 
(Langer, 2005:41). 
Bédié’s exclusion of Ouattara and the marginalization of the RDR did not facilitate a reconciliation and 
reintegration of the northern defectors back into the PDCI coalition. Quite contrary, it aggravated the 
cleavages between north and south and a new strategy to rebuild a strong and viable ruling coalition 
playing on this very dichotomy, was pursued by Bédié, based on two different policies:  Taking over the 
land policies of the FPI, and elaborating further on the policy of excluding the northerners pursued 
before the 1995 elections by introducing the concept of Ivoirité.   
The concept built on the idea that members of the Akan ethnic group of the southern regions, for 
cultural and historical reasons, were better suited as rulers than those of other ethnic groups within the 
country (Dozon, 2000: 51-52). Furthermore, the concept made a sharp distinction between indigenous 
Ivorians and foreigners, and it divided the population of Côte d’Ivoire into 3 groups: those whose 
parents were both born in Côte d’Ivoire, those with only one Ivorian born parent, and those with none 
(Tiemoko, 1995: 149). Such distinctions hit particularly hard in the Ivorian society where immigration 
had been strongly encouraged by government policies for more than 40 years. For historical reasons it 
also resulted in the downgrading of many northerners Ivorian nationhood. The country now known as 
Burkina Faso had technically been a region within the French colony of Côte d’Ivoire since the colonial 
era and, a continuous traffic of northerners across the border had been the norm, making it difficult for 
many of them to prove the Ivorian nationhood, thereby becoming second rank citizens. This 
manipulation of political and judicial rights of citizenship along ethnic groups found resonance within a 
wide range of voters in the plantation areas of the south, where indigenous people had become a 
minority in their own homeland. At the same time, it marked a change in the political interests of the 
Baoulé, who had formerly gained from the liberal immigration policies of the regime, but in the 1990s 
became increasingly opposed to the immigrants. Most importantly, for the supporters and the enemies 
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of the RDR the concept of Ivoirité effectively excluded the northerners from political influence, not least 
the RDR leader, Ouattara. 
The Ivoirité concept also played into the strategy pursued by Bédié to take over the land policy of the 
FPI. In order to secure the PDCI the majority of votes in the elections, Bédié engaged in a strategy of 
coopting the FPI constituencies in the south and south east to create a new majority of non-Muslim, 
non-northern Ivoirians which would make up a majority of approximately 55 per cent of the population 
(Boone, 2009: 191).  As described in earlier chapters, the leading opposition party, FPI and its leader, 
Laurent Gbagbo, had its roots in the university milieu, where open opposition to the PDCI rule saw its 
beginning in the 1980s. From 1990 the FPI and the student and teachers’ syndicates organized 
demonstrations mobilized on broad urban dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the government. 
Although Gbagbo did not have any affiliation with the agricultural realities in the countryside (Losch, 
2003: 56), faced with the need to mobilize voters for the elections of 1990, the FPI engaged in rural 
dissatisfaction as a strategy to broaden its support. In a situation where the economic policies were 
dictated from international donors, and therefore narrowed the space of political debate, combined 
with the inexperience of many opposition politicians, playing on the ethnic issues fused with social 
discontent seemed an effective way to mobilize voters against the PDCI (Campbell, 2003: 35).  Already in 
the 1990 elections, Gbagbo, he  himself a Bété originating from Gagnoa, a town in the south west 
(Langer, 2003: 6), was able to mobilize voters in his home region around a platform  that blamed 
foreigners for Côte d’Ivoire’s economic crisis and insisted the indigenous Ivoirians should claim back 
their land (Boone, 2009: 190). The strategy had alsoproved able to mobilize the voters provoked by 
some intra-Akan frustrations (Tiemoko, 1995: 147). Consequently, the FPI demanded a land reform that 
would make it possible for the autochthones to regain their customary land (Dozon, 2000: 48). 
Therefore, along the lines of the strategy of overtaking the policy of the FPI in order to undermine the 
FPI’s primary source of voter mobilization, a new land law of December 1998 was put forward by Bédié. 
The law excluded foreigners from land ownership, provided a major redistribution of land, called for the 
abrogation of the acquired land rights and holdings of hundreds of thousands of immigrants born in 
Côte d’Ivoire and left unprotected the rights of anyone who was not recognized as indigenous by 
members of the local community - a law whose primary beneficiaries would be the FPI constituencies 
(Boone, 2009: 192). In effect, the new coalition building strategy of Bédié was built on ethno-politics and 
the issue of land rights came to dominate the political agenda, thereby further complicating the already 
existing ethnic conflicts in the countryside. 
Not surprisingly, the Muslims of the North felt increasingly marginalized and persecuted, in this climate 
of increasing ethnic-religious tension, which was only emphasized by several assassination attempts 
against the president of the conseil national islamique (Tiemoko, 1995: 146). In this atmosphere the RDR 
was increasingly becoming a Northern regionalist party, although, as Crook stresses, this was not the 
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case from the beginning. From the start, the RDR was able to pick up constituencies in the south as well, 
and in spite of the very anti-northern policies of the FPI, the two large opposition parties were actually 
able to join forces in a “Front republicain” in the run-up to the 1995 elections (Crook, 1997: 226). But the 
PDCI strategy of marginalization of the northerners was effective in provoking the RDR into a regionalist 
rhetoric, based on sentiments of grievances expressed in Charter of the North that started circulating 
(Tiemoko, 1995: 146). 
6.3. Post-PDCI Coalition Building Strategies 
The period from 1999 to 2002 is one of the most eventful and dramatic in the post-colonial history of 
Côte d’Ivoire. Less than a year before the anticipated elections of 2000 in which the new ruling coalition 
constructed by Bédié was to be tested against the oppositional elites, Bédié and his government were 
removed by an unexpected coup d’état carried out by a grouping in the armed forces under the 
leadership of General Gueï (le Pape, 2002: 24), who replaced the government with a Comité national de 
salut public (CNSP) (Kieffer, 2000: 28). This first successful coup in post-colonial Ivorian history resulted 
from dissatisfaction with a systematic downgrading of the armed forces mixed with personal grudges 
against Bédié among the army officers and, finally resentment within the army against the xenophobic 
character of the PDCI policies. The overall economic mismanagement of the Bédié government provided 
the mutineers with the motive they needed in order to remove Bédié. 
The initially successful development policy of the Elephant d’Afrique had by 1999 proved to be as 
dependent on the rising cocoa and coffee prices as was the ancient regime of the Ivorian Miracle. But 
from 1999 the commodity prices fell again leading Côte d’Ivoire back into recession (Kouadio, 2009: 
92)(Langer, 2003: 7). In 1998 the foreign debt reached 14.7 billion USD, and the unpaid bills by the Bédié 
regime from 1998 to 1999 alone amounted to almost 1 billion USD (Kouadio, 2009: 96). But what turned 
out to be even more dangerous to the political stability of the country, was that despite the high growth 
rates from 1994 to 1998, there had been no clear sign of an improvement in the livelihood of the Ivorian 
people. In fact, an increasing part of the population suffered from the consequences of poverty. In other 
words, the inequality within the Ivorian society grew in spite of macroeconomic growth, causing a major 
social crisis when the commodity prices on coffee and cocoa dropped once again in 1999 (Akindès, 
2001: 17). The growing foreign debt proves that the new regime working under totally different 
conditions than Houphouët-Boigny’s 33 years of rule had done. Bédié did not have the same resources 
to distribute or sustain an extensive patronage network as Houphouët-Boigny (Kieffer, 2000: 35). Due to 
the privatization of the public enterprises that finally took form during the reign of Ouattara34, Bédié did 
not have the same career opportunities to offer his supporters. 
The lack of finances was especially felt in the armed forces, as Bédié systematically downgraded the 
importance of the army throughout his time in power. During the Bédié rule, the army experienced 
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 By 1999 all but six parastatals had been privatised (Langer, 2003: 12) 
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constant budget reductions, and when the CFA Franc was devaluated by 50 per cent in 1994, Bédié 
rejected the soldiers’ demand of a wage raise (Kieffer, 2000: 32). Simultaneously, the army officers were 
suffering from a loss of other channels of access to rents. Comfortable wages and material conditions 
for the army officers, during the Houphouët-Boigny regime had been accompanied by positions for 
military personnel in the state administration and, for superior officers in public enterprises too (Kieffer, 
2000: 30-31). In the last years of Houphouët-Boigny’ rule, under Ouattara’s administration, the ties 
between the government and the army had been further cemented as the armed forces were entrusted 
the task of internal security formerly allocated to the police. The fact that less amiable relations existed 
between the army and the Bédié government became apparent when General Gueï refused to dissolve 
groups of anti-PDCI demonstrators in the run up for the 1995 elections. Bédié responded by removing 
Gueï in October the same year and progressed to carry out a Baoulisation of the officers (Kieffer, 2000: 
32-33). 
At the same time a change in the social character in the recruitment in the army, provoked by the 
economic misery, further alienated the soldiers from the government. Until the economic crisis of the 
late 1980s the army had predominantly recruited among the least fortunate youth of the country. 
However, due to the economic hardship and the lack of job opportunities for the educated youth, 
eventually even students opted for a career in the army. Thus, slowly a generation of highly educated 
recruits came to dominate the army (Kieffer, 2000: 34). As the competition for a military career rose, 
corruption became a precondition for recruitment and a career in the army (Kieffer, 2000: 34). A feeling 
of marginalization evolved among the ethnic groups of northern origin within the army. Combined with 
the witnessing of the xenophobic and anti-northern policies of the PDCI, a growing resentment against 
the government was the result. Apart from one single soldier of the Akan group, all the mutineers of the 
1999 coup belonged to the northern ethnic groups: Bété, Gueré, Yacouba, Sénoufo, and Dioula (Kieffer, 
2000: 36).Therefore, the coup d’etat of 1999 appeared to have the character of being first and foremost 
an attempt to abort the creation of a new ruling coalition based on xenophobic policies and the 
exclusion of the northerners, and secondly a revolt against the penetrating dominance of the Akans and 
Baoulés. 
It was rumoured that the coup d’etat was orchestrated by Ouattara in coorporation with the northern 
neighbour of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso. Whether these rumours are true is, however, hard to prove at 
best, if not completely untrue. Evidently, some of the army officers were close to Ouattara, such as the 
generals Palinfo and Coulibaly (Kouadio, 2009: 129), but there is no proof that Ouattara was himself 
involved in the coup. In fact, a closer examination of the leaders behind the mutiny reveals that the 
group consisted of officers belonging to differing ethnic groups affiliated to different factions within the 
opposition. Indeed, the coup did not appear to have any specific political agenda, and in the months 
following the coup a series of new coup attempts and of reshuffles within the CNSP and the transitional 
governments set up by the officers reveal that the new men in power were marred by internal struggles 
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(Banégas & Losch, 2002: 148). Finally, after many speculations, general Gueï proclaimed his own 
candidature in the upcoming elections that were to be held in 2000. 
Arguably there is a resemblance between the entrance of general Gueï into politics and that of Ouattara 
in 1990, as they both came as outsiders with no background in Ivorian politics, and seemingly with no 
initial ambitions of building up a political career of their own. In this perspective they both entered 
politics with a well defined goal: Ouattara to readjust the economy and general Gueï to off-track the 
rising prominence of ethno-politics. However, after having tasted power, they both went for the 
presidency. Still, one important difference between the two remained: While Ouattara quickly built a 
constituency within the PDCI among fellow technocrats, with what seemed like a natural support in the 
strong northern regions due to his ethnic and social background, general Gueï, with only a few months 
to the elections, did not have the same base of support to lean on for the mobilization of the voters. 
Faced with three big opposition parties (the dethroned PDCI, the FPI and the RDR), Gueï had only limited 
resources available to raise his mobilizing capabilities. To improve his chances of winning the elections 
General Gueï needed to pursue a highly effective way of mobilizing voters. Consequently he who had 
been at the front of the coup with the explicit goal of getting rid of the xenophobic character of recent 
Ivorian politics, completely turned around politically and adopted the ethnic and xenophobic rhetoric of 
his predecessor and embraced the concept of Ivoirité (Boone, 2009: 193) (Akindès, 2004: 21). With this 
concept in hand Gueï managed to get not only Ouattara but also the PDCI candidate, Bédié, excluded 
from running for president (Kouadio, 2009: 27). 
With their top candidate excluded, the RDR decided to boycott the elections of 2000, nevertheless the 
elections were carried out as planned. However, this time the FPI decided to participate, thereby 
breaking the alliance of with the RDR.  The presidential election which was now in reality a duel 
between Gueï and Gbagbo, was held in an atmosphere of extreme tension. As both candidates 
proclaimed themselves winners, violent confrontations on a scale never seen before in Côte d’Ivoire 
broke out between government forces and supporters of Gbagbo, leaving thousands injured and 120 
killed (Akindès, 2009: 41). Eventually, Gueï was forced to flee the country, leaving the presidency for 
Gbagbo. Instead of accepting the demands of the opposition parties of new elections, Gbagbo decided 
to stay in power on the claim that he had been democratically elected. This led to a second shock of 
violent clashes, this time between FPI and RDR supporters (Akindès, 2004: 5) However, with PDCI and 
RDR having boycotted the presidential election, the legitimacy of Gbagbo’s presidency was 
questionable. In the following years of FPI rule, the political climate was characterized by increasing 
political violence, and increasing persecution of northerners and immigrants carried out by the Gbagbo 
government (Boone, 2009: 193)(Kouadio, 2009: 28). In 2002 another coup d’etat was attempted by 
mutineers in the armed forces. The attempt at removing Gbagbo and achieving control of the southern 
cities failed, but instead the situation escalated into a state of civil war which split the country in two 
parts along a North-South divide (Kouadio, 2009: 27). 
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The outbreak of civil war in 2002 was proof that Gbagbo and the FPI elite had not manage to build a new 
and viable political settlement in substitution for the old. The attempt had been undermined by the 
party’s own ethno-political agenda which significantly narrowed the possibility of broadening the ruling 
coalition in a way that would serve to stabilize their powerbase. Any such attempts were further 
hampered by the lack of rents available to fund a broad coalition.  
After the dismantlement of CAISTAB in 1999, a new fund Association nationale des producteurs de café-
cacao de Côte d’Ivoire (ANAPROCI) took over the same funds formerly controlled by CAISTAB 
(McGovern, 2011: 139). It appears that Gbagbo’s attempts to take over control of the cocoa rents, had 
only been partially achieved and that the cocoa and coffee rents to a large extent were still controlled 
by the Baoulé elite. The ANAPROCI had been running an autonomous life from the FPI government, 
which by McGovern and Losch is attributed to Laurent Gbagbo’s lack of connections to the cocoa and 
coffee business, due to his background as a Bété and as an academic city dweller (McGovern, 2011: 
139,161)(Losch, 2003: 56-57). Even though the FPI government in time managed to gain partial control 
of the cocoa and coffee rents, those rents never became an important source of funding to the new 
ruling elite which instead increasingly relied on the new emerging oil rents (McGovern, 2011: 140). 
The escalation of political violence in the first decade and a half of multipartism, and the lack of other 
resources nurtured the emergence of a new strategy of political recruitment and of new rent-seeking 
opportunities. This is especially evident in the student organisation FESCI. Originally a university based 
organization of political activists loosely associated with the main opposition parties of the FPI and the 
RDR, this organization became increasingly militant in the repeated clashes and street fights with 
government security forces. By Gbagbo’s rise to power after the elections in 2000, FESCI had become so 
involved in the power struggles of the elites that an internal war between FPI and RDR factions led to 
brutality including reports of rape and murder at the university campus in Abidjan (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008: 27). Since then, the organization had been associated as a paramilitary faction of the FPI. 
The FESCI leaders were closely linked to the FPI elite, and a strict hierarchy of clientelist networks 
secures the loyalty of its members who were awarded with money and protection, and could expect 
access to increasingly powerful positions within the hierarchy (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 34).  
Simultaneously, the new FPI regime continued the persecution of Northerners and foreigners, 
expropriating their farms (Boone, 2009: 193), while having secured the loyalty of the army by carrying 
out a de-baouelisation in the officers’ ranks and installing predominantly officers of the Bété group 
which Gbagbo also belonged to (Kouadio, 2009: 128). In 2001 the FPI government adopted a new 
identification policy, which required that anyone who requested an identity document had to prove his 
nationality by obtaining a statement of origin issued by a committee from their village of origin, ignoring 
the difficulty especially for many Northerners connected with providing the necessary evidence due to 
the inconsequent birth recordings which were prevalent in the Northern areas (Bah, 2010: 597). 
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In other words, the possibilities of new ruling elite of the FPI to broaden its support base was seriously 
restrained by its anti-Baoulé and anti-Northerner policies on which it had mobilized to get into power 
and, instead the ruling elite was now relying on its ability to build a new patronage network based on 
militancy. 
6.4. The Impossible Settlement 
Despite the promise of the mutineers of the 1999 Christmas coup d’etat to bring the country back on 
the democratic track, and despite the fact that they actually kept their promise in the sense that 
elections were carried out as planned in 2000, in reality the coup d’etat became the end of a process 
towards further democratization of the Ivorian society. Instead the coup d’etat marked the beginning of 
a new era in Ivorian politics increasingly dominated by political violence to an extent otherwise 
completely unknown to the country. The rent-seeking behavior of the two men who ruled the country in 
this short period from the final collapse of PDCI dominance and to the outbreak of civil war in 2002, 
indicates how the interaction between rent-seeking, elite mobilization capabilities and multiparty 
elections worked in the Ivorian context. Both general Gueï and Gbagbo appeared to have entered into 
politics with an element of democratic “conscience”. Gbagbo entered politics as the front figure of an 
excluded elite of teachers criticizing the PDCI regime for the lack of liberal political will. Gueï 
approximately 25 years later, imposed himself as a transitional ruler with the goal of bringing Ivorian 
politics back on a viable democratic track. However, once in power, they both gave up their democratic 
ideals. One could argue, that the democratic ideals of these two men, were just a scam to enable them 
to get into power. However, evidence to their backgrounds suggests otherwise. Like Ouattara, who 
came to power with no previous ambitions of a political career, and then suddenly jumping into the 
game, the same seems to have been the case with Gbagbo and Gueï. In other words, the benefits of 
being in power in Côte d’Ivoire is simply too tempting to give up. However, without huge sources of 
funding available, like those that the PDCI controlled and successfully used in the two first multiparty 
elections, the means of mobilizing voters is limited. While Gbagbo lacked the funding to build up an 
effective party organization able to challenge the party machinery and patronage networks of the PDCI, 
Gueï had very little time to organize his campaign and an even weaker political organization behind him. 
In both cases, their solution was to appeal to ethnic grievances and resentment and build up new 
patronage networks along ethnic ties. In turn, this nourished the rising self-conscience of the 
Northerners who, with Ouattara as a rallying point, had improved their organizational capabilities to the 
point that their holding power had become strong enough for them to insist on a better position within 
the political settlement. And, as land ownership became the main issue in the rent-seeking behavior as 
other channels of rent distribution diminished, the power-holding of elite factions now build more and 
more on ethnic patronage and access to land. This proved to make any attempt of bringing together a 
coalition of elites impossible and, so in 2002 the political settlement finally broke down, as powerful 
excluded elites retreated to violence as their last resource of holding power.  
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7. The Evolution of the Ivorian Political Settlement 
Khan’s framework implies that any clientelist political settlement will eventually evolve towards 
‘competitive clientelism’. While we cannot realistically isolate the impact of democratic institutions from 
the impact of other factors that affects the political settlement, the evolution of the political settlement 
provides us with insights into the interplay between multiparty elections and the mechanisms that 
obstructed the consolidation of a version of competitive clientelism in a stronger operational 
equilibrium.  
7.1. Political Stability under Constrained Patrimonialism 
As the PDCI took over the rule of Côte d’Ivoire from the French in 1960, the ruling elite also took on the 
project of establishing a ruling coalition along the features of ‘strong patrimonialism’. Certainly, 
Houphouët-Boigny managed to secure the management of the cocoa and coffee rents in his own hands 
personally, thereby meeting the capitalist interests of the ruling elite, and also empowering himself and 
the top of the ruling elite to control the political and bureaucratic systems through rents allocation.  Yet, 
a situation of strong patrimonialism was never completely achieved. It was not until the late 1970s that 
the Akan dominated ruling elite managed to implement its economic policies in the North, after having 
changed its attitude towards the Northern chiefs and accepted them into the ruling elite itself. 
Furthermore, the attempt of Houphouët-Boigny to ban the home town associations had been 
successfully resisted, and from the mid-1970s the government took the consequence and, instead of 
banning them attempted to use them as a means of controlling ethnic tensions. These strategic turn-
arounds of the PDCI government coincided with the first sign of weakness in the economic policies, and 
the government relied increasingly on aspiring local elites to privately fund local development projects. 
This in turn increased the holding power of lower level agents who were now able to base their power 
on local constituencies, a tendency which was further increased by the introduction of semi-competitive 
elections within the framework of the PDCI single party state in 1980. Thus, a ruling coalition of ‘strong 
patrimonialism’ was never fully achieved and, instead one of ‘constrained patrimonialism’ evolved 
based on the authoritarian institutional framework of single-party rule. This proved able to provide a 
strong operational equilibrium in the first three decades of post-colonial Ivorian history, thanks to the 
huge profits from the cocoa and coffee export that made the system economically viable. 
7.2. Towards Competitive Clientelism and Political Instability 
In the 1980s it became apparent that the development policies of the PDCI government had failed. 
Despite the huge investments in the industrial sector, the Ivorian economy remained dependent on the 
cocoa and coffee rents, which turned out to be disastrous as the commodity prices on those products 
started to fall. The shock from the decline in rents caused frustrations on all levels of the ruling coalition. 
Although the ruling elite initially resisted the privatizations, the implementation of SAP reforms stressed 
the cohesiveness of the ruling elite and caused intensifying intra-elite struggles over rents, and the rent-
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seeking strategies became increasingly damaging. The cocoa-war was launched in order to secure the 
farmers their income, but instead it indebted the state and rendered the CAISTAB insolvent. As the state 
could no longer provide jobs for all the graduating students, the government introduced the programme 
of the return of the youth to the countryside which exacerbated the struggles over land in the 
countryside and fueled ethnic tensions.  
In 1990 the austerity measures of the SAP reforms led to riots and unexpectedly, many lower level 
organizations defected from the ruling coalition to join the opposition instead. When Houphouët-Boigny 
accepted the introduction of multiparty elections it strengthened the excluded elite as it could now 
openly organize and agitate against the PDCI regime. In the following months the political settlement 
moved towards ‘competitive clientelism’, as the elites’ need for lower level agents to mobilize voters in 
the upcoming elections improved the bargaining power of the lower levels. However, the opposition 
lacked both the coherent policies and the organizational capabilities to mobilize voters and 
consequently, the FPI pursued a strategy of mobilizing over ethnic grievances, thereby alienating 
themselves from the majority of the voters. While in the logics of Khan’s framework, the introduction of 
democratic institutions should result in increasing holding power of both excluded elite and lower level 
organizations of the ruling coalition, this only happened at a slow pace in the Ivorian case. A 
fundamental change to the political settlement did not occur until the Ouattara faction of the PDCI, as a 
result of the internal struggles over rents and, over the leadership of the PDCI, defected from the party 
to establish the RDR, which for the first time made the opposition strong enough to pose a real 
challenge to the ruling coalition, that now had to be recomposed by Bédié. With the new strength of the 
excluded elites a final shift to ‘competitive clientelism’ could be expected as the competition between 
elites increased.  
Nevertheless no decisive change in the vertical distribution of power occurred. Although Bédié 
implemented changes in the immigration policies, these changes benefitted the same ethnic group that 
had formerly benefitted from the immigration policies, which were the Akan ethnic groups. In this way, 
the new policy did not change the main beneficiaries of the ruling elite’s distributional policies, but 
rather narrowed the group of beneficiaries to the very core of the ruling coalition’s supporters. Bédié 
introduced restrictive institutions against the northerners in order to exclude the RDR from influence 
and, to keep Ouattara from running for the presidency. Not as a consequence of growing bargaining 
power of the lower levels but, in the lack of rents available for distribution to the lower level supporters 
of the regime, the ruling elite turned to the use of land rights as a patronage resource, which further 
nourished the ethnic tensions. Hence, while ‘competitive clientelism’ initially seemed to develop out of 
the democratization in 1990, the lower level organizations remained weak and the ‘constrained 
patrimonialism’ became increasingly restrictive throughout the 1990s, even bordering on ‘vulnerable 
patrimonialism’. 
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As the policies of Bédié’s government resulted in the exclusion of more groups from the access to rents, 
dissatisfaction grew and resulted in the defection of powerful lower level agents in the army, as they 
toppled Bédié in the coup of December 1999. The following tumultuous reshuffles in the transitional 
government reveals that the process of coalition building had become difficult as a result of factionalism 
and, that at this point ‘competitive clientelism’ had finally evolved. However, ‘competitive clientelism’ 
did not result in the consolidation of the democratic institution.  
7.3. Repressive Competitive Clientelism and the Descend into War 
Khan points to the necessity of informal institutions in society to create a “rule of law” that defines the 
framework for the cycling of elites, thereby securing the opposition that it will not be excluded for a 
longer period. As the above section implies the competing elites in Côte d’Ivoire turned to violent and 
repressive means instead of respecting the electoral process as a means to circulating the elites in 
power. Four reasons why the possibility of intra-elite trust was already passed as ’competitive 
clientelism’ ensued, can be identified. 
Firstly, the lack of organizational capabilities of the opposition parties prolonged the period of 
‘constrained patrimonialism’, even as it turned less economically viable and the operational equilibrium 
grew weaker. Although new associations were founded in the wake of the political liberalization in 1990 
and, despite the new local associations that were founded by the elites as organizations to mobilize 
support for them,– except from the Muslim part, as explained by Widner– the Ivorians simply lacked a 
culture of associational life to facilitate local participation or initiative and, the political organizations 
remained under the control of elites. These observations are supported by MacLean’s findings that 
indicates that political organizations at the village level were delegitimized due to the domination of 
local patrons. The hometown associations, which were supposed to further the interests of the local 
communities cutting across ethnic ties, were in fact, as has been shown, dominated by ethnic groups. 
Thus, although the multiparty elections increased the holding power of the excluded elites and, 
although lower levels of the opposition in the cities became more active in organizing strikes and 
demonstrations, it was not sufficient to alter the distribution of power. 
Secondly, the long period of ‘constrained patrimonialism’ in a strong operational equilibrium, led the 
competing elites to misperceive of their relative holding power. After thirty years of stable and almost 
unchallenged rule, it is not surprising that the ruling elite believed they would be able to continuously 
keep the opposition excluded. At first Gueï, then Gbagbo both believed they were able to keep the 
opposition excluded by repressive means, and under the rule of Gbagbo, the repression against the 
northerners intensified, both at an institutional level with the introduction of identity cards, and also on 
the security level, as violence erupted throughout the country. 
Thirdly, the coincidence that elites had fragmented into ethno-religious factions while the lower level 
organizations were already characterized by ethnic affiliation may have locked the vertical political 
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structures in ethnical blocks and reinforced the ethnically based patron-client structures that left the 
lower level agents in a relationship of reciprocity much to their disadvantage. Under any circumstances 
it seems reasonable to argue that the vertical ethnic structures further encouraged mobilization along 
the lines of ethnic resentment and grievances. It was also in this situation with lacking economic 
capabilities of the political parties, that the allocation of land rights became mobilized as a patronage 
resource by Bédié and, the excluded elite were pushed to look for other means of “easy” voter 
mobilization which consequently resulted in ethnic mobilization. The increasing competition dragged 
the ruling coalition of the PDCI itself into this strategy as it grew weaker and the opposition stronger. 
Fourthly, as a result of the lack of lower level legitimate political organization and the prolonged period 
of ‘constrained patrimonialism’, turning increasingly repressive, the lower level organizations that did 
eventually increase their holding power, did so because political violence created a demand for violent 
mobilization, thus lower levels became militant. The rising level of violence and the growing power of 
lower level organizations such as the FESCI led Côte d’Ivoire into a political settlement in crisis, and 
finally resulted in civil war in 2002. 
7.4. Concluding Remarks 
By applying Khan’s framework the thesis reveals from a political economy perspective the complex 
interaction of overlapping causes to the Ivorian conflict and, as such provides us with new insights into 
the Ivorian crisis which has otherwise only been described from varies isolated perspectives. 
From the findings we can conclude that the introduction of multiparty elections only to a moderate 
degree influenced the political stability in Côte d’Ivoire. The initial push that brought the constrained 
patrimonialism out of a strong operational equilibrium came from the economic crisis beginning in the 
late 1970s, as it resulted in intra-elite struggles and increasingly damaging rent-seeking of the ruling elite 
in order to keep the ever-growing ruling coalition satisfied. Maybe a swift change to ‘competitive 
clientelism’ would have resulted in a different outcome, but the political liberalization in the 1990s did 
only empower the lower levels of the ruling coalition in a slow pace which was not sufficient to 
fundamentally alter the political settlement. However, as a result of defections from the ruling elite and 
the opposition’s newly won right to organize openly, the ruling elite was forced to introduce restrictive 
means in order to maintain power. In the specific settings of Ivorian political organization, where the 
elite had factionalized along ethnic lines and the ethnic character of the lower level organizations 
combined with a general lack of organizational and economic capabilities, the introduction of multiparty 
elections tempted elites to pursue strategies of voter mobilization based on sentiments of ethnic 
grievances. Thereby the mechanisms of multiparty elections reinforced the use of repressive means as 
the voter mobilization strategies hampered the possibilities of the ruling elite to broaden its support 
base. The findings indicate the necessity of paying special analytical attention to the voter mobilization 
capabilities of the political parties in order to understand the likely outcome of democratic transitions. 
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Côte d’Ivoire remained in a political settlement in crisis - the country divided in a government controlled 
South and a North held by rebel forces - until Gbagbo lost the 2010 elections and was removed from 
office by force in April 2011. The only way out of crisis appears to be the introduction of a democratic 
form of competitive clientelism. Whether Ouattara and the new elite in power have learned the lesson 
that an authoritarian patrimonial political settlement is no longer viable is still an open question. 
However, the findings from above indicates that further research into the contemporary political 
settlement of Côte d’Ivoire could contribute with significant insights into the role democratic institutions 
in the consolidation of a stronger operational equilibrium. 
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Appendix: Key Political Events in Côte d’Ivoire 1960-2011 
  
 
Ruling 
Coalition 
Head of State Year Key Political Events 
PDCI 
1960-
1990 
  
  
Felix 
Houphouët-
Boigny 
  
  
  
1960 Independence 
1980 Decentralization and 1st round of semi-competitive elections 
1985 2nd round of semi-competitive elections 
1987 Houphouët-Boigny launches a 27 months long cocoa-war 
rendering the CAISTAB insolvent, the government suspends 
reimbursement of its foreign debt 
PDCI 
1990-
1993 
Felix 
Houphouët-
Boigny 
  
1990 Multiparty democracy introduced, 1st round of multiparty 
elections (won by PDCI), Ouattara becomes the country's first 
Prime Minister 
1993 President Felix Houpouët-Boigny dies, Bédié becomes the new 
president and Ouattara resigns as PM 
PDCI 
1993-
1999 
Henry Bédié 1994 Devaluation of the CFA Franc 
  1995 2nd round of multiparty elections: opposition boycotts the 
legislative elections but competes in presidential (PDCI and 
Bédié win both) 
CNSP 
1999-
2000 
Robert Gueï 1999 Coup d'état: Bédié is toppled by a faction of dissatisfied army 
officers 
     
FPI 
2000-
2011 
  
  
Laurent Gbagbo 
  
  
  
2000 3rd round of multiparty elections: Gbagbo and FPI wins. Bédié 
attempts to manipulate the results but is forced to flee the 
country as violent riots shake the country 
2002 Coup attempt failes but escalates into civil war 
2004 UN facilitates peace negotiations, the country remains de facto 
divided in an Northern and a Southern part 
2010 4th round of multiparty elections: Ouattara and RDR win, but 
Gbagbo refuses to resign. Civil war breaks out a new 
RDR 
2011- 
Alassane 
Ouattara 
  
2011 April: After intensive fights Gbagbo is arrested with help from 
American and French forces, and Ouattara is installed as 
president 
    
